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Displaying the 5 latest comments.
Submitted | first-name | support | concern | top-concern | message |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2026-11-17 01:07:00 +02:00 | Hill | No I do not | All of the above | 7. General Support for Transparency, Negotiation Windows & Oversight | I support the core transparency and governance reforms in the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill [B23–2026], specifically the mandatory publication of signed coalition agreements in the Provincial Gazette (Section 60A), the extension of post-election negotiation deadlines from 14 to 30 days, the automatic dissolution and prompt replacement of Mayoral Committees when a mayor vacates office (Section 60(5)), and the requirement that Municipal Public Accounts Committees be chaired by non-coalition opposition or independent councillors (Section 79A). |
2026-11-17 01:05:25 +02:00 | Hill | No I do not | All of the above | 6. Unfunded Mandates & Flawed Impact Assessment (COGTA SEIAS Report Defects) | I draw the Committee’s attention to critical administrative defects in COGTA’s Final SEIAS Report (dated 25 June 2026). The Department’s impact assessment allocates zero budgetary or human-resource provisions for councillor capacitation and legal compliance, fails to confirm the Bill’s constitutionality in Part 3 (Section 8a), and improperly characterises citizens exercising their multi-party democratic right to distribute votes across smaller parties as a ‘behaviour that must be changed’ (Section 2.2). Under Section 195 of the Constitution and PAJA, Parliament cannot enact legislation predicated on an incomplete impact assessment that seeks to engineer voter behaviour rather than enforce executive accountability. |
2026-11-17 01:04:06 +02:00 | Hill | No I do not | All of the above | 5. Threat of Electoral Thresholds Being Re-inserted | I strongly oppose any attempt by the Portfolio Committee on COGTA to re-insert minimum electoral thresholds into the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill during public deliberations. As confirmed by the Office of the Chief State Law Adviser, electoral thresholds violate Sections 158 and 160(8) of the Constitution, undermine proportional representation under Section 157, and disenfranchise voters who support smaller civic parties and independent ward councillors. |
2026-11-17 01:02:38 +02:00 | Hill | No I do not | 4. Vague Competency & Qualification Gatekeeping | While I support professionalising local government, Clause 2 (proposed Section 21(3)) introduces vague, undefined requirements that office bearers and committee chairs possess ‘relevant experience, skills or qualifications.’ Without objective statutory benchmarks or an independent verification mechanism, this clause invites subjective, partisan gatekeeping to disqualify legitimate opposition and independent councillors. | |
2026-11-17 01:01:19 +02:00 | Hill | No I do not | All of the above | 3. Secret Ballots vs. Voter Accountability | I object to provisions in Clauses 6, 8, 10, 12, and 17 that permit municipal councils to elect or remove office bearers via secret ballot. Ratepayers have a democratic right under Section 195 of the Constitution to know how their elected councillors vote on executive leadership. Secret ballots shield councillors from voter accountability and enable clandestine backroom deal-making. Council votes on office bearers must be conducted openly by a recorded show of hands or roll-call vote. |
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- Ending “Revolving-Door” Mayors & Service Collapse:
Since 2016, major metros like Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, and Nelson Mandela Bay have cycled through mayors every few months. Supporters argue that endless motions of no confidence halt budgets, stall capital projects, and leave residents without water or electricity while councillors trade positions. - Bringing Secret Deals into the Sunlight:
Currently, coalition pacts are often treated as private party documents hidden from voters. Requiring every coalition agreement (and any amendment) to be published in the Provincial Gazette allows ratepayers and civil society to hold coalition partners directly accountable for broken promises. - Protecting Public Watchdogs (MPACs):
Governing coalitions frequently capture Municipal Public Accounts Committees to bury irregular expenditure. Mandating that the MPAC Chairperson come from an opposition party or non-coalition independent councillor—and protecting them from arbitrary firing—restores genuine financial oversight. - Realistic Negotiation Timeframes:
Expanding the post-election window from 14 days to 30 days stops rushed, panic-driven coalitions and gives parties time to negotiate coherent service delivery programmes rather than merely dividing up mayoral committee seats.
- Ending “Revolving-Door” Mayors & Service Collapse:
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- Insulating Incompetence for a Full Year:
Civil society watchdogs (such as My Vote Counts) and governance analysts warn that stability is not an end in itself. Freezing motions of no confidence for 12 months—unless a leader commits a crime or violates the Constitution—means ratepayers are stuck with an ineffective or paralysed mayor for an entire budget cycle. - Centralising Control in Pretoria:
Allowing the national Minister of COGTA to dictate the structure and dispute-resolution rules of local coalition agreements encroaches on the constitutional autonomy of local government (Section 151 of the Constitution) and creates an opening for national political interference in local councils. - Undermining Representative Accountability via Secret Ballots:
Voters elect councillors to take public stances on who governs their town. Permitting councils to vote by secret ballot on mayors and speakers removes transparency, making it impossible for citizens to know whether their ward councillor honoured their mandate or sold their vote. - Creating Unworkable Legal Deadlocks:
Making coalition agreements legally binding contracts enforceable through prescribed dispute mechanisms risks turning routine political disagreements into protracted High Court battles that freeze municipal administration even further. - Flawed Policy Foundation & Unfunded Mandates:
COGTA’s own Final SEIAS Report (25 June 2026) budgets R0 (“None”) for councillor capacitation and legal compliance, leaves the constitutional verification box blank, and improperly blames voters for “spreading votes amongst a magnitude of political parties” rather than addressing political party misconduct.
- Insulating Incompetence for a Full Year:
