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Displaying the 15 latest comments.
Submitted | first-name | support | concern | top-concern | message |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2026-11-17 01:07:00 +02:00 | Hill | No I do not | All of the above | 7. General Support for Transparency, Negotiation Windows & Oversight | I support the core transparency and governance reforms in the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill [B23–2026], specifically the mandatory publication of signed coalition agreements in the Provincial Gazette (Section 60A), the extension of post-election negotiation deadlines from 14 to 30 days, the automatic dissolution and prompt replacement of Mayoral Committees when a mayor vacates office (Section 60(5)), and the requirement that Municipal Public Accounts Committees be chaired by non-coalition opposition or independent councillors (Section 79A). |
2026-11-17 01:05:25 +02:00 | Hill | No I do not | All of the above | 6. Unfunded Mandates & Flawed Impact Assessment (COGTA SEIAS Report Defects) | I draw the Committee’s attention to critical administrative defects in COGTA’s Final SEIAS Report (dated 25 June 2026). The Department’s impact assessment allocates zero budgetary or human-resource provisions for councillor capacitation and legal compliance, fails to confirm the Bill’s constitutionality in Part 3 (Section 8a), and improperly characterises citizens exercising their multi-party democratic right to distribute votes across smaller parties as a ‘behaviour that must be changed’ (Section 2.2). Under Section 195 of the Constitution and PAJA, Parliament cannot enact legislation predicated on an incomplete impact assessment that seeks to engineer voter behaviour rather than enforce executive accountability. |
2026-11-17 01:04:06 +02:00 | Hill | No I do not | All of the above | 5. Threat of Electoral Thresholds Being Re-inserted | I strongly oppose any attempt by the Portfolio Committee on COGTA to re-insert minimum electoral thresholds into the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill during public deliberations. As confirmed by the Office of the Chief State Law Adviser, electoral thresholds violate Sections 158 and 160(8) of the Constitution, undermine proportional representation under Section 157, and disenfranchise voters who support smaller civic parties and independent ward councillors. |
2026-11-17 01:02:38 +02:00 | Hill | No I do not | 4. Vague Competency & Qualification Gatekeeping | While I support professionalising local government, Clause 2 (proposed Section 21(3)) introduces vague, undefined requirements that office bearers and committee chairs possess ‘relevant experience, skills or qualifications.’ Without objective statutory benchmarks or an independent verification mechanism, this clause invites subjective, partisan gatekeeping to disqualify legitimate opposition and independent councillors. | |
2026-11-17 01:01:19 +02:00 | Hill | No I do not | All of the above | 3. Secret Ballots vs. Voter Accountability | I object to provisions in Clauses 6, 8, 10, 12, and 17 that permit municipal councils to elect or remove office bearers via secret ballot. Ratepayers have a democratic right under Section 195 of the Constitution to know how their elected councillors vote on executive leadership. Secret ballots shield councillors from voter accountability and enable clandestine backroom deal-making. Council votes on office bearers must be conducted openly by a recorded show of hands or roll-call vote. |
2026-11-17 00:59:43 +02:00 | Hill | No I do not | 2. National Ministerial Overreach into Local Coalitions | I object to proposed Section 60A(3), which empowers the national Minister of COGTA to prescribe the form, manner, and dispute-resolution mechanisms for local coalition agreements. Granting a national cabinet minister regulatory control over local political partnerships encroaches on the constitutional autonomy of municipalities under Section 151 of the Constitution and invites national political interference into local governance. | |
2026-11-17 00:58:18 +02:00 | Hill | No I do not | All of the above | 1. The 12-Month Accountability Shield | I object to Clauses 6, 8, 10, and 12 of the Bill, which restrict motions of no confidence against municipal office bearers to once every 12 months. Insulating an Executive Mayor, Speaker, or Whip from political removal for a full year—unless a criminal conviction or formal constitutional breach is already proven—strips elected councillors of their primary oversight tool under Section 160 of the Constitution and leaves ratepayers trapped under failing administrations. |
2026-11-17 00:05:11 +02:00 | Andre | No I do not | All of the above | 1. The 12-Month Accountability Shield | |
2026-11-16 23:58:54 +02:00 | Esmé | Yes I do | All of the above | 7. General Support for Transparency, Negotiation Windows & Oversight | |
2026-11-16 23:02:45 +02:00 | Eugene | No I do not | 1. The 12-Month Accountability Shield | ||
2026-11-16 22:45:20 +02:00 | Ian | Not fully | Other | Public Comment on the Coalitions Bill I support measures to improve stability in coalition governments, but I strongly oppose any provisions that weaken democratic accountability, transparency or the rights of voters. South Africans deserve effective, honest and accountable local government, not legislation that protects politicians from being held responsible for poor performance. I am particularly concerned about: Protection of mayors from removal: No mayor should be protected from a motion of no confidence for 12 months if there is evidence of incompetence, corruption, misconduct or serious service delivery failures. Transparency: Voting by councillors should be open and recorded so that the public can hold their elected representatives accountable. Political interference: National government should not be given excessive powers to interfere in the independence of municipalities. Smaller political parties: Legislation must not unfairly disadvantage smaller parties or independent representatives. Accountability: Coalition agreements must be transparent, publicly accessible and enforceable, with clear consequences for misconduct and failures in governance. Residents of municipalities such as Nelson Mandela Bay have experienced the consequences of political instability, poor governance and inadequate service delivery. We need stable governments, but stability must never become an excuse to protect incompetent or corrupt politicians. I therefore request that Parliament amend the proposed legislation to strengthen transparency, protect democratic rights and ensure that elected officials remain accountable to the people they serve. I do not support the Bill in its current form and call for the necessary amendments before it is passed. | |
2026-11-16 22:38:05 +02:00 | Sharon | No I do not | All of the above | 2. National Ministerial Overreach into Local Coalitions | |
2026-11-16 22:17:54 +02:00 | Bonita | No I do not | 2. National Ministerial Overreach into Local Coalitions | ||
2026-11-16 22:12:12 +02:00 | Jackie | No I do not | 1. The 12-Month Accountability Shield | Where Do You Stand? ? I OBJECT to the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill in its current form (I oppose restricting council accountability through 12-month removal bans, granting national ministerial control over local coalitions, and leaving loopholes for secret ballots or vague qualification gatekeeping). | |
2026-11-16 22:11:14 +02:00 | Norman | Not fully | All of the above | 1. The 12-Month Accountability Shield |
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- Ending “Revolving-Door” Mayors & Service Collapse:
Since 2016, major metros like Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, and Nelson Mandela Bay have cycled through mayors every few months. Supporters argue that endless motions of no confidence halt budgets, stall capital projects, and leave residents without water or electricity while councillors trade positions. - Bringing Secret Deals into the Sunlight:
Currently, coalition pacts are often treated as private party documents hidden from voters. Requiring every coalition agreement (and any amendment) to be published in the Provincial Gazette allows ratepayers and civil society to hold coalition partners directly accountable for broken promises. - Protecting Public Watchdogs (MPACs):
Governing coalitions frequently capture Municipal Public Accounts Committees to bury irregular expenditure. Mandating that the MPAC Chairperson come from an opposition party or non-coalition independent councillor—and protecting them from arbitrary firing—restores genuine financial oversight. - Realistic Negotiation Timeframes:
Expanding the post-election window from 14 days to 30 days stops rushed, panic-driven coalitions and gives parties time to negotiate coherent service delivery programmes rather than merely dividing up mayoral committee seats.
- Ending “Revolving-Door” Mayors & Service Collapse:
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- Insulating Incompetence for a Full Year:
Civil society watchdogs (such as My Vote Counts) and governance analysts warn that stability is not an end in itself. Freezing motions of no confidence for 12 months—unless a leader commits a crime or violates the Constitution—means ratepayers are stuck with an ineffective or paralysed mayor for an entire budget cycle. - Centralising Control in Pretoria:
Allowing the national Minister of COGTA to dictate the structure and dispute-resolution rules of local coalition agreements encroaches on the constitutional autonomy of local government (Section 151 of the Constitution) and creates an opening for national political interference in local councils. - Undermining Representative Accountability via Secret Ballots:
Voters elect councillors to take public stances on who governs their town. Permitting councils to vote by secret ballot on mayors and speakers removes transparency, making it impossible for citizens to know whether their ward councillor honoured their mandate or sold their vote. - Creating Unworkable Legal Deadlocks:
Making coalition agreements legally binding contracts enforceable through prescribed dispute mechanisms risks turning routine political disagreements into protracted High Court battles that freeze municipal administration even further. - Flawed Policy Foundation & Unfunded Mandates:
COGTA’s own Final SEIAS Report (25 June 2026) budgets R0 (“None”) for councillor capacitation and legal compliance, leaves the constitutional verification box blank, and improperly blames voters for “spreading votes amongst a magnitude of political parties” rather than addressing political party misconduct.
- Insulating Incompetence for a Full Year:
