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Displaying the 15 latest comments.

Submitted
first-name
support
concern
top-concern
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2026-07-11 04:14:04 +02:00
Anthea
No I do not
Structural Function Creep & Tracking
2026-07-10 20:19:28 +02:00
Trudie
No I do not
All of the above
Soft Discrimination & Digital Exclusion
2026-07-10 18:42:54 +02:00
Erin
No I do not
All of the above
Soft Discrimination & Digital Exclusion
This proposal invites unwarranted government control and, with the enormous numbers of cell phone thefts, identity thefts, hackers and scammers operating on South Africa it's an invitation to disaster for ordinary citizens. No, definitely not, this is a terrible idea from start to finish.
2026-07-10 18:02:03 +02:00
Buhle
No I do not
All of the above
Centralised Cyber & Security Risk
2026-07-10 08:55:23 +02:00
Marrthinus
No I do not
All of the above
Soft Discrimination & Digital Exclusion
Of course this will be used to discriminate. China has a similar mechanism in place, and all the authoritarian leftist governments in the west want to do exactly the same. We have concrete evidence how mechanisms like this is used to discriminate and control populations. We cannot allow this for a single moment.
2026-07-10 08:50:13 +02:00
Nonzwakazi
No I do not
All of the above
Centralised Economic Kill-Switch Risks
2026-07-10 05:48:36 +02:00
Lucy
No I do not
All of the above
Soft Discrimination & Digital Exclusion
2026-07-09 19:24:08 +02:00
Marius
No I do not
All of the above
Centralised Economic Kill-Switch Risks
2026-07-09 13:45:46 +02:00
Nic
No I do not
All of the above
Structural Function Creep & Tracking
2026-07-09 13:44:24 +02:00
Ahmed
No I do not
All of the above
Soft Discrimination & Digital Exclusion
This is political over reach & the beginning of digital tyranny
2026-07-09 11:19:40 +02:00
Natalie
No I do not
All of the above
Centralised Economic Kill-Switch Risks
I do not trust the government with so much power. No doubt they would abuse it beyond anything we have seen before. We would be completely trapped and helpless and at their mercy.
2026-07-09 11:16:51 +02:00
Dudley
No I do not
All of the above
Centralised Economic Kill-Switch Risks
2026-07-09 09:51:47 +02:00
Norette
No I do not
All of the above
Structural Function Creep & Tracking
2026-07-09 03:13:42 +02:00
Gail
No I do not
Structural Function Creep & Tracking
Ultimate loss of freedom to choose. Being locked down and controlled. This needs to be voted on by the people of South Africa.
2026-07-09 02:48:18 +02:00
Sobuhle
No I do not
Other

Proponents of the draft regulations, including the Department of Home Affairs, state that the transition to a decentralised digital identity network is a necessary evolution that will fundamentally modernise South Africa. Their core arguments include:

    • A Leapfrog Milestone for National Security:
      Moving to a decentralised digital framework represents an extraordinary technological milestone for South Africa. By introducing cryptographic device-binding, asymmetric encryption, and liveness-detecting facial recognition, the state is effectively “leapfrogging” older, outdated legacy systems used by global powers. This modern infrastructure will significantly curb routine identity fraud, phase out physical document forgery, and secure the digital economy.
    • Unprecedented Bureaucratic Convenience:
      The MyMzansi application introduces massive administrative efficiency. Being able to securely renew an identity credential remotely via a basic facial scan on a smartphone eliminates the logistical burden of traveling to a state office. Furthermore, establishing automated “Verified Relationships” with trusted private partners (like banks and telecom networks) removes friction from the everyday FICA/KYC compliance process, enabling near real-time, bi-directional address and detail updates without tedious paperwork.
    • Gold Standard Fraud Prevention:
      Strict cryptographic device-binding—anchoring your legal identity token to a single physical device—serves as the gold standard in modern cybersecurity. It guarantees that even if a criminal steals your personal data, usernames, or passwords, they cannot remotely impersonate you because they do not physically possess your unique bound mobile device.
    • A Vital Systemic Reset:
      The rolling 5-year expiry and the 10-year in-person check-in requirements are necessary tools to keep the master population register dynamically accurate. The 10-year physical verification rule acts as a vital security reset to ensure that long-term inactive digital profiles belong to living, verified citizens, purging “ghost” records from the database.
    • Enforced Privacy Guardrails:
      Proponents emphasise that the policy features robust, built-in statutory protections. The regulations explicitly align with POPIA, strictly banning private corporations from using identity pipelines for data commercialisation, consumer profiling, or open-ended intelligence gathering. Additionally, physical IDs remain entirely valid, meaning the system is completely voluntary.

Civic groups, privacy advocates, and cybersecurity experts argue that while modernisation is welcome, the draft regulations introduce expansive risks and administrative penalties that demand much tighter constitutional safeguards. Their core arguments include:

    • Expanded National Cyber-Defences Vulnerability:
      While leapfrogging older tech sounds ambitious, critics point out that cutting-edge software is only as secure as the human guardrails managing it. Given the South African public sector’s history of systemic data breaches, ransomware disruptions, and weak IT controls, connecting the authoritative population register directly to corporate servers via live APIs vastly expands the nation’s “attack surface.” Consolidating civil registry access into a centralised live network creates an incredibly high-risk target for global hacking syndicates.
    • The 10-Year Bureaucratic Queue Trap:
      Forcing an essential civil right like a national identity credential to automatically “lapse” triggers deep administrative anxiety. Under Regulation 20(5), if a citizen remains entirely active digitally for a decade but does not happen to have a physical, in-person touchpoint with a Home Affairs branch or an accredited bank, their legal credential is wiped out. This rule unfairly penalizes compliant, digitally active citizens by forcing them back into physical queues to re-prove their identity from scratch.
    • Severe Device Dependency and Paralysing Lockouts:
      South Africa suffers from exceptionally high rates of mobile device theft, muggings, and phone damage. By legally tying an individual’s legal identity token exclusively to a single smartphone, a lost or stolen device instantly locks that citizen out of their civic and banking lives. Because the draft regulations fail to detail a transparent, secure, and automated remote path to unbind an old phone and verify a new one, losing a device could mean immediate economic and administrative paralysis.
    • Corporate Privacy Creep:
      Automating “near real-time” data synchronisation loops with banking and telecommunications giants chips away at the vital boundary that should separate sovereign public civic registries from private, profit-driven corporate infrastructure. Despite statutory promises, distributing live data updates across multiple third-party commercial servers inherently increases the risk of data leaks and corporate surveillance.
    • The Deepening Digital Divide:
      Despite textual promises that implementation will not unreasonably exclude anyone, the real-world trajectory of modern infrastructure is that state and corporate platforms rapidly optimise for digital pathways to cut operational costs. Over time, poor, elderly, or rural South Africans who rely exclusively on physical documents run a severe risk of facing systemic “soft discrimination”—including longer processing delays, reduced human customer support, and slower access to essential public utilities and services.