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Following the 4 November 2026 Local Government Elections, which produced a record wave of hung councils across South Africa—with roughly 65% of metropolitan and local municipalities (well over 100 councils) failing to produce an outright single-party majority—Parliament is prioritising the Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill [B23–2026], widely known as the “Coalitions Bill”.

Introduced by the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) as a Section 76 Bill (ordinary legislation affecting provinces and local government), the Bill seeks to amend the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act No. 117 of 1998) to institutionalise coalition governance. Because civil society pressure forced Parliament to abandon an earlier attempt to rush the Bill into law prior to election day, post-election coalition talks are still operating under the old 14-day rules. The rules finalised through this public participation process will permanently govern how municipal coalitions are formed, managed, and dissolved for the remainder of the 2026–2031 municipal term and future elections.

Key Proposed Statutory Changes

Parties and independent ward councillors forming a coalition in a hung council must sign a written coalition agreement. This agreement must be submitted to the Municipal Manager and provincial MEC, and published in the Provincial Gazette.

Motions of no confidence against a Speaker, Council Whip, Executive Committee member, or Executive Mayor/Deputy Executive Mayor may only be tabled once every 12 months. Exceptions are strictly limited to five statutory grounds (constitutional violation, criminal conviction, MFMA financial misconduct, serious breach of the Code of Conduct, or inability to perform functions).

Extends the deadline to convene the first council meeting, appoint district representatives, and elect mayors/executive committees from 14 days to 30 days after election results are declared.

Empowers municipal councils to decide whether elections and removals of office bearers happen by a show of hands or secret ballot.

Clarifies that when an Executive Mayor vacates office, the entire Mayoral Committee dissolves immediately. A new mayor must be elected within 14 days, and a new committee appointed within 14 days thereafter.

Mandates that the Municipal Public Accounts Committee (MPAC) Chairperson be drawn from an opposition party or independent councillor outside the governing coalition, and protects them from arbitrary removal without the provincial MEC’s written concurrence.

Requires municipal office bearers and committee chairpersons to possess experience, skills, or qualifications relevant to local government, or be capacitated to perform their functions.

Questions and answers

The 4 November 2026 municipal elections produced roughly 65% hung councils across metropolitan and local municipalities—meaning over 100 councils have no single ruling party. Although Parliament abandoned an earlier bid to rush this Bill into law before election day following civil society pushback, the Portfolio Committee on COGTA is actively deliberating on the Bill now. The rules finalised through this public participation process will govern how coalitions are formed, managed, and dissolved for the remainder of the 2026–2031 municipal term and future elections.

Under Clause 14 (proposed Section 60A), entering into a signed, written coalition agreement is mandatory for parties and independent ward councillors forming a coalition in a hung council. Once signed, it must be lodged with the Municipal Manager, sent to the provincial MEC for local government, and published in the Provincial Gazette. Any subsequent changes to the deal must also be gazetted. If a party governs via a minority arrangement without a formal coalition, it remains subject to council voting rules without the contractual framework of Section 60A.

No. Clauses 6, 8, 10, and 12 establish a 12-month “cooling-off” period during which only one ordinary motion of no confidence may be tabled against a Speaker, Whip, Executive Committee member, or Executive Mayor. However, a removal motion can be brought at any time if it is based on five specific grounds: (a) violating the Constitution, (b) a criminal conviction (including under corruption laws), (c) financial misconduct under the MFMA, (d) a serious breach of the Councillor Code of Conduct, or (e) an inability to perform the legislated functions of office. Critics warn that proving “inability to perform” or waiting for a criminal conviction still makes timely political accountability exceptionally difficult.

The Bill formally inserts a statutory definition of an “independent ward councillor” into the Municipal Structures Act (Clause 1) and explicitly includes independents alongside political parties in coalition agreements (Section 60A) and Whip oversight duties (Section 41B). Independent councillors who are not part of the governing coalition are also eligible to chair the Municipal Public Accounts Committee (Section 79A). However, citizens must remain vigilant that electoral thresholds are not re-inserted during committee deliberations, which would sideline independents and smaller parties.

Previously, councils had just 14 days after election results were declared to hold their inaugural meeting, elect a Speaker and Mayor, and appoint district representatives—often leading to chaotic, overnight deals driven by cabinet-post horse-trading rather than service delivery plans. Clauses 3, 4, 9, and 11 extend these deadlines to 30 days to allow structured, transparent negotiations. Conversely, if a Mayor vacates office mid-term, Clause 13 mandates that a new Mayor be elected within 14 days and a new Mayoral Committee appointed within 14 days thereafter to avoid administrative vacuums.

No. In its Final Socio-Economic Impact Assessment System (SEIAS) Report (dated 25 June 2026), COGTA failed to tick “Yes” on whether the Bill is constitutional (leaving Part 3, Section 8a blank), claimed there were “None” (zero) stakeholder disagreements despite documented objections from research institutes like PARI and ACCORD, and budgeted R0 (“None”) for implementation—even though councils will face new legal drafting fees, Provincial Gazette publication costs, and mandatory councillor capacitation requirements. Most concerningly, the SEIAS report states that citizens’ behaviour of “spreading votes amongst a magnitude of political parties” is a problem that “must be changed”—blaming voters rather than fixing political party accountability.

Not in the currently tabled text [B23–2026]. State Law Advisers flagged constitutional concerns that electoral thresholds could infringe on proportional representation. However, senior members of the COGTA Portfolio Committee have publicly stated that Parliament intends to revisit the threshold debate during public hearings. Submitting your view now places public opposition or support for thresholds directly on the official parliamentary record.

Yes. Under Sections 59(1)(a) and 72(1)(a) of the Constitution, both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) are constitutionally obligated to facilitate meaningful public involvement in their legislative processes. Because this is a Section 76 Bill affecting provincial and local governance, it must pass through both houses of Parliament and provincial legislatures. Furthermore, under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) and Constitutional Court precedent (Doctors for Life), lawmakers cannot treat public participation as a rubber-stamping exercise—they must apply their minds to substantive, individualized submissions. Unlike online petitions, which Parliament logs as a single collective signature, Dear South Africa delivers your unique submission directly to the Portfolio Committee on COGTA as an independent, legally recognised representation.

The Municipal Structures Amendment Bill

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The SEIAS report

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The Government’s Impact Assessment (SEIAS) Explained

Before any Bill is introduced into Parliament, the sponsoring department must complete a Socio-Economic Impact Assessment System (SEIAS) report to prove that the proposed law is constitutional, financially costed, and backed by evidence.

For the Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill [B23–2026], the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) submitted its Final SEIAS Report (Phase 2) on 25 June 2026. Reading the Department’s own official impact assessment reveals major administrative gaps, unfunded mandates, and troubling assumptions about South African voters that you can cite directly in your submission.

    • What the SEIAS Report Says:
      In Section 2.2 (“What and whose behaviour does the proposal seek to change?”), COGTA explicitly identifies “Communities” as a group whose behaviour “must be changed”, defining the problematic community behaviour as “The spreading of votes amongst a number / magnitude of political parties contesting municipal elections”.
    • Why This Matters to You:
      In a constitutional multi-party democracy, citizens have a fundamental right to vote for whichever party or independent ward councillor best represents their community. Rather than requiring political parties to mature into coalition governance, COGTA’s official policy document treats voters exercising democratic choice as a socio-economic problem to be corrected.
    • What the SEIAS Report Says:
      • Section 2.5 admits that the Bill creates new implementation and compliance costs for councils and political parties—specifically “the capacitation of municipal office bearer[s] or chairperson[s]” (required under Clause 2), “legal costs” for drafting binding coalition agreements, and “publication” costs in the Provincial Gazette.
      • Yet in Section 6(a) (Medium-Term Expenditure Framework budgets), Section 6(b) (Human Resource Plan staffing), and Part 3, Question 4 (“Summarise the cost to government in terms of budgetary outlays and institutional capacity”), COGTA writes “None”.
    • Why This Matters to You:
      Passing unfunded statutory mandates onto already financially distressed municipalities means ratepayers will ultimately absorb the unbudgeted legal, training, and administrative costs.
    • What the SEIAS Report Says:
      • In Part 3, Question 8(a), which asks “Is the proposal Constitutional?”, COGTA left both the “Yes” and “No” boxes completely blank.
      • In Section 2.3(b), asking for a summary of the main disagreements raised by stakeholders and experts, COGTA wrote “None”—even though its own consultation table on the preceding pages documents substantive warnings from the Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI) (warning that open voting intimidates councillors of conscience) and ACCORD (warning that show-of-hands voting undermines secret-ballot protections under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and SADC election guidelines).
      • Meanwhile, the report confirms that on 27 May 2026, the Office of the Chief State Law Adviser (OCSLA) forced COGTA to strip out earlier electoral threshold clauses because they violate Sections 158 and 160(8) of the Constitution.
    • Why This Matters to You:An impact assessment that leaves its constitutional sign-off blank and erases documented expert objections fails the basic standards of rational, transparent lawmaking required under Section 195 of the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).
    • What the SEIAS Report Says:
      While Clause 14 turns coalition agreements into legally binding contracts, COGTA’s risk matrix in Section 8(c) acknowledges that “Disagreements between political parties (either on policy matters, positions/leadership)” are a major risk. However, the only dispute-resolution mechanism listed is “Resilient engagements with political parties, to sensitise them about the prescribed timeframes”.
    • Why This Matters to You:
      Making coalition pacts legally binding without an accessible, low-cost arbitration mechanism means routine political disputes will spill into expensive High Court litigation funded by municipal coffers—freezing council administration even further.
SEIAS Report Section (25 June 2026) Official COGTA Entry Practical & Constitutional Reality

Section 2.2: Behaviour that “must be changed”

“Communities: The spreading of votes amongst a number / magnitude of political parties”

Blames citizens for exercising multi-party democratic choice rather than holding politicians accountable.

Section 6 & Part 3.4: Budgetary & HR Cost to Government

“None”

R0 allocated despite new legal drafting, Provincial Gazette notices, and mandatory councillor training.

Part 3, Q8(a): “Is the proposal Constitutional?”

Left completely blank (neither Yes nor No ticked)

Fails to certify constitutionality even after OCSLA struck down earlier electoral thresholds as unconstitutional.

Section 2.3(b): Summary of stakeholder disagreements

“None”

Contradicts COGTA’s own table recording objections from PARI and ACCORD over voting secrecy and intimidation.

Section 8(c): Coalition dispute-resolution mechanism

“Resilient engagements… to sensitise” parties

No statutory mediation or arbitration—leaving deadlocked councils to fight in the High Court.

If you wish to reference the SEIAS report in your comment box on the Dear South Africa form, you can copy, adapt, or build on this text:

“I object to Parliament processing the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill [B23–2026] on the basis of COGTA’s defective Final SEIAS Report (dated 25 June 2026). The Department’s impact assessment allocates zero budgetary or human-resource provisions for mandatory councillor capacitation and legal compliance (Section 6 & Part 3.4), leaves the constitutional verification box blank (Part 3, Question 8a), omits documented expert disagreements (Section 2.3b), and improperly classifies citizens distributing their votes across multiple parties as a ‘behaviour that must be changed’ (Section 2.2). Under Section 195 of the Constitution and PAJA, Parliament must require a properly costed, constitutionally verified impact assessment before enacting legislation that restricts democratic accountability in local councils.”

SABC News. House Chairperson of the National Assembly Cedric Frolick has tempered expectations about the Local Government Municipal Structures Amendment Bill, widely known as the Coalition Bill, saying it would be impossible to finalise it before coalition negotiations are concluded. The Bill was brought to Parliament with too little time to be finalised before the elections.

SABC News. With the November local government elections approaching, questions remain over whether the Coalitions Bill can be passed in time, and whether legislation can bring stability to hung councils. Joining us to talk about the Bill, its implications for smaller parties, and what voters should watch out for is independent elections analyst, Mike Atkins

Radio 702. Jane Dutton speaks to University of the Witwatersrand School of Governance, Public and Development Management, Associate Professor Prof William Gumede about the importance of the Municipal Coalitions Bill .

SABC News. Unpacking the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill

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