ROLLING THE DICE IN THE DARK:

SOUTH AFRICA’S PATCHWORK APPROACH TO GAMBLING REGULATION

South Africa is in the midst of a gambling boom. Driven by widespread smartphone adoption and an aggressive surge in marketing, the industry saw an estimated R1.5 trillion wagered in the 2024/2025 financial year alone. Yet, while the digital betting landscape evolves at breakneck speed, our regulatory framework is hopelessly stuck in the analog age.

Rather than implementing a cohesive national strategy to protect consumers and the economy, lawmakers are currently applying a disjointed patchwork of band-aids.

Take, for instance, the recently gazetted Draft National Gambling Amendment Regulations. The Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC) is proposing strict new rules, including a centralised national database to track excluded problem gamblers. On paper, this sounds like a necessary safeguard. In reality, these regulations apply almost exclusively to physical, brick-and-mortar casinos. They focus heavily on security guards visually identifying problem gamblers at the door, completely ignoring the digital elephant in the room: the millions of South Africans carrying a casino in their pocket.

Why is the government ignoring the online space? The tragic irony is that they aren’t—they just haven’t finalised the paperwork.

Comprehensive legislation designed to modernise our industry and nationally regulate interactive online gambling was actually drafted and passed by Parliament back in 2008. But for over 15 years, the National Gambling Amendment Act of 2008 has been gathering dust, sitting unsigned on the President’s desk due to endless political wrangling over provincial revenue sharing.

Because this national legislation remains in limbo, we are left with a fractured system where the internet is borderless, but our gambling laws are strictly provincial. Currently, an online sports betting operator can secure a license from just one Provincial Licensing Authority—say, the Western Cape or Mpumalanga—and legally operate nationwide. That single licensing province reaps all the tax revenue, while the other eight provinces are left to deal with the localised social fallout of problem gambling without seeing a cent of the financial benefit.

Recognising this imbalance, National Treasury recently stepped in with a blunt instrument. They have proposed a sweeping 20% national tax on gross gambling revenue from all online betting. Framed as a “sin tax” to internalise the societal costs of problem gambling, the proposal is an attempt to bypass the provincial licensing monopoly and funnel cash directly into the national fiscus. However, attempting to tax a digital industry that remains largely unlegislated at a national level is putting the cart before the horse. Industry experts warn that slapping a punitive tax on top of existing provincial levies could simply drive operators and punters straight into the hands of unregulated, offshore black markets.

Meanwhile, civil society has had enough. In response to mounting pressure over the “scourge” of betting logos dominating sports jerseys, television screens, and billboards, the DTIC is now scrambling to finalise stringent new gambling advertising regulations by July 2026. The Advertising Regulatory Board is simultaneously pushing for strict new codes to keep gambling ads away from minors and limit the use of influencers.

We are currently witnessing a regulatory scramble: Treasury is trying to tax the digital space, the DTIC is trying to censor its marketing, and provincial boards are hoarding its revenues—all while the actual law meant to govern interactive gambling remains unsigned.

Treating the symptoms without curing the disease is unsustainable. South Africa does not need more piecemeal amendments targeting physical slot machines while the digital world burns. We need a unified, modernised national framework that acknowledges the reality of borderless internet gambling, protects vulnerable citizens, and creates a fair, transparent economic environment.

With deadlines for public comment on Treasury’s 20% tax proposal and the Draft National Gambling Amendment Regulations closing soon, the window for citizens to weigh in on this legislative mess is open. It is time for the public to demand a sensible, comprehensive approach before the government gambles away any chance of effective regulation.

Sincerely,

Rob Hutchinson, founder DearSouthAfrica.co.za

MY BUDGET TIP FOR THE MINISTER OF FINANCE

Proposal: Adjustment of the VAT Registration Threshold from R1 million to R2 million

1.⁠ ⁠Historical Context and Inflationary Correction

The compulsory VAT registration threshold has remained stagnant at R1 million since 2009. Over the past 17 years, the purchasing power of the Rand has diminished significantly. When adjusted for cumulative inflation, R1 million in 2009 is equivalent to over R2.3 million in today’s terms. By maintaining the status quo, the Treasury is effectively lowering the barrier for entry into the VAT system every year, capturing smaller and more vulnerable businesses that the original 2009 legislation intended to protect. A shift to R2 million is a vital correction to reflect current economic realities.

2.⁠ ⁠Protecting Thin Profit Margins

Small businesses operate in a highly competitive landscape where profit margins are often razor-thin. For a business turning over R1 million to R2 million annually, the administrative and financial weight of VAT compliance is disproportionately high. When these businesses are forced to register, they face a “lose-lose” scenario: raise prices and lose customers to informal competitors, or absorb the 15% cost and face insolvency. Lifting the threshold allows these SMMEs to remain price-competitive while they stabilise.

3.⁠ ⁠Reducing the Administrative and Compliance Burden

VAT compliance is not just a financial cost; it is a massive productivity drain. Small business owners are typically the primary operators, accountants, and administrators. The complexity of VAT filing—and the severe penalties for clerical errors—diverts essential focus away from growth and job creation. Increasing the threshold provides a “regulatory breathing room,” allowing businesses to scale their internal systems before taking on the complexities of the VAT net.

4.⁠ ⁠Preventing Business Failure and Supporting Job Creation

The “missing middle” of the South African economy—businesses attempting to transition from micro-enterprises to sustainable firms—frequently collapse at the current R1 million turnover mark. The sudden jump in compliance requirements is often the primary catalyst for failure. SMMEs are the backbone of employment in South Africa; by providing this relief, the Treasury incentivises formalisation without the immediate threat of administrative strangulation.

Conclusion:

In light of the high failure rate of small businesses and the nearly two decades of inflationary erosion, I urge the Minister to adjust the VAT threshold to R2 million. This is a practical, high-impact intervention that will safeguard the backbone of our economy and encourage sustainable growth.

Sincerely,

Robert Hutchinson, founder, DearSouthAfrica.co.za

MY BUDGET TIP #2 FOR THE MINISTER OF FINANCE

Proposal: Scrap Personal Income Tax (PAYE) — replace with a Consumption-Based Tax System (VAT)

1.⁠ ⁠Historical Context and the Need for Change

South Africa’s reliance on a narrow base of Personal Income Tax (PAYE) is unsustainable. A small percentage of the population carries the national budget, leading to high emigration rates and tax fatigue. By shifting to a consumption-based model, we broaden the tax base to include everyone participating in the economy—including tourists and the informal sector—while rewarding productivity and work.

2.⁠ ⁠Immediate Economic Stimulus

Scrapping PAYE would provide an immediate, substantial increase in take-home pay for every formal worker. This “instant raise” would flow directly back into the economy, driving demand and growth. By removing the “tax on work,” South Africa becomes an incredibly attractive destination for global talent and investment, encouraging businesses to hire without the massive overhead of payroll tax compliance.

3.⁠ ⁠Progressive Protection via Zero-Rating

The primary argument against a VAT-centric system is its impact on the poor. However, South Africa already zero-rates 19 basic food items. To implement this fairly, I suggest an expanded “dignity basket” of goods (basic hygiene, essential medicines, and entry-level digital access). This ensures that while luxury and discretionary spending are taxed, the cost of survival remains shielded for lower-income households.

4.⁠ ⁠The Luxury VAT: Taxing the High Spenders

To maintain progressivity, I propose a multi-tiered VAT system. While standard goods might attract a 20% rate to offset the loss of PAYE, “luxury goods” (e.g., luxury vehicles, jewellery, and high-end electronics) should attract a “Luxury VAT” of 25-30%. This ensures that high-income earners—the primary drivers of luxury consumption—contribute proportionately to the fiscus. This model is more effective than traditional wealth taxes because it is harder to evade and scales directly with a person’s lifestyle.

5.⁠ ⁠Inflationary Realities and Fairness

The tax system must reflect the current value of the Rand. Since the VAT threshold and tax brackets have often failed to keep pace with inflation, we have seen “bracket creep” stifle the middle class. A consumption tax is inherently more honest; you are taxed on what you choose to take out of the economy, not what you put in through your labor. Combining the abolition of PAYE with this model creates a “growth-first” environment where workers are rewarded for their effort.

Conclusion: Moving to a consumption-centric model simplifies the tax code, reduces the administrative burden on SARS, and creates a pro-growth environment. By taxing spending rather than earning, we encourage a culture of savings and investment while ensuring that everyone—especially those living a luxury lifestyle—contributes their fair share to the development of our nation.

Sincerely,

Rob Hutchinson, founder DearSouthAfrica.co.za

THE R2.3 MILLION VICTORY: WHAT THE NEW VAT THRESHOLD MEANS FOR YOUR SMALL BUSINESS

In the 2026 Budget Speech, Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana announced a long-overdue correction: the compulsory VAT registration threshold will increase from R1 million to R2.3 million, effective 1 April 2026. For those of us who have been championing the “missing middle” of South African business, this is a watershed moment.

Since 2009, the R1 million ceiling has acted as a “tax on growth,” pulling micro-enterprises into a complex administrative net long before they reached a sustainable scale. By adjusting this threshold to align with nearly two decades of inflation, the Treasury has finally acknowledged that a R1 million business in 2026 is significantly smaller and more vulnerable than it was in 2009.

Why This Matters: Beyond the Numbers

For the average SMME, VAT registration isn’t just about the 15% tax; it’s about the compliance cost.

• Cash Flow: Businesses often pay VAT to SARS before their clients have actually paid the invoice.

• Complexity: Monthly or bi-monthly filings require specialised accounting software or external tax practitioners, eating into razor-thin margins.

• Competitive Edge: Small firms serving the public can now keep their prices lower without the mandatory 15% markup, allowing them to compete more effectively with larger entities.

The “Interim Trap”: What if you exceed R1 million today?

This is the most pressing question for business owners right now. If your turnover hit R1.1 million this month, do you register now or wait for April?

Because the current law (R1 million) remains in force until 31 March 2026, the official position is that you are still legally required to register within 21 days of exceeding the threshold. However, we are in a unique “grey zone.”

Our Suggestions for Businesses in the Middle:

1. Don’t Just “Take a Chance”: SARS’s AI-enabled “Project AmaBillions” is more efficient than ever at spotting non-compliance. Ignoring a current legal obligation can lead to backdated penalties and interest that could wipe out your business.

2. Submit, then Deregister: If you hit the R1 million mark before April, the safest legal route is to apply for registration. Once the new law kicks in on 1 April, and if your turnover is safely below R2.3 million, you can apply for voluntary deregistration.

3. Wait for the “Clarification Note”: We expect SARS to issue a Binding General Ruling or a Practice Note shortly. It is highly likely they will offer a “grace period” or a simplified transition for those caught in this five-week window to avoid the administrative nightmare of registering a business only to deregister it 30 days later.

4. Consult Your Accountant on the “Payments Basis”: If you must register now, ensure you apply to be on the Payments Basis (if you qualify). This ensures you only pay VAT to SARS once you’ve actually received cash from your customers, easing the liquidity crunch.

Will SARS “Write it Off”?

Historically, SARS does not “write off” obligations. However, the Commissioner has the power to remit penalties and interest if a taxpayer can show they acted in good faith during a period of legislative transition.

The Bottom Line

This win proves that public participation works. We provided the math, we highlighted the struggle, and the Treasury listened. This R2.3 million threshold is a lifeline for the backbone of our economy—the small business owner.

As we wait for the final gazetted regulations, keep your records meticulous. The burden is lifting, but we must cross the finish line legally.

Rob Hutchinson, DearSouthAfrica.co.za

PROVINCIAL RENAMING IS MORE THAN JUST A MAP CHANGE

South Africa is currently witnessing a quiet but profound tug-of-war over its identity. On one side of the Drakensberg, King Misuzulu kaZwelithini has issued a royal call to strike “Natal” from the provincial lexicon, leaving us simply with KwaZulu. On the other side of the Hex River, the drumbeat for Cape Independence—the so-called “CapeXit”—has moved from the fringes of social media into the formal halls of Parliament.

At first glance, these are two separate regional issues. But look closer, and you’ll see they are symptoms of the same national ailment: a growing disillusionment with the “1994 Compromise” and a desire to redefine the boundaries of our belonging.

The King’s argument for “KwaZulu” is rooted in the restoration of dignity. “Natal,” a Portuguese word for “Christmas,” is a colonial timestamp. To many, the hyphen in KwaZulu-Natal is a scar—a forced marriage between a proud, indigenous kingdom and a colonial administrative block.

However, as those of us in the public participation space know, symbols carry weight. Renaming the province isn’t just a matter of changing stationery; it’s a jurisdictional statement. The Ingonyama Trust already holds 30% of the province’s land in a unique legal structure. By moving the name from “KZN” to “KwaZulu,” the monarchy is signaling a return to a pre-1994 identity—one where traditional authority holds a more central place in the modern state.

While KZN looks backward to reclaim a name, the Western Cape is looking outward to escape a system. The push for Cape Independence is fuelled by a different fire: the belief that the “one, sovereign, indivisible state” promised by our Constitution has failed to deliver on safety, infrastructure, and economic growth.

President Ramaphosa’s recent, firm rejection of a secession referendum in January 2026 highlights the constitutional wall. The law says we are one. The people in the streets of Cape Town and the hills of Zululand are increasingly asking: At what cost?

Whether we are debating a name change in the east or a border change in the west, the missing ingredient is the same: meaningful public participation. A provincial name change is not a royal decree, nor is secession a simple poll. Both require a fundamental shift in our “Social Contract.” According to our current standards, a name change requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament and a constitutional amendment. It requires every voice—from the AmaBhaca in uMzimkhulu who fear Zulu hegemony, to the suburbanites in Durban worried about the R100-million rebranding bill—to be heard.

If we allow these movements to become purely ethnic or purely secessionist, we risk the “Recrimination Nation” scenario—a country of fractured enclaves blaming one another for a collective decline.

The call to rename KZN and the call for Cape autonomy are both demands for recognition. They are a signal that the centralised, “one-size-fits-all” model of 1994 is straining under the weight of 2026. We don’t need to fear these debates, but we must demand that they happen within the light of transparent, rigorous public engagement.

If we are to drop the hyphen in our province names or rewrite the rules of our provinces, let it be because we found a better way to live together, not because we’ve finally given up on the idea of South Africa.

Robert Hutchinson, founder, Dear South Africa.

Municipal Demarcation Authority




IS THE INDEPENDENT MUNICIPAL DEMARCATION AUTHORITY BILL DESIGNED TO ALTER ELECTORAL OUTCOMES?

Municipal Demarcation Authority

By Ciaran Ryan, for DearSouthAfrica.co.za

There is good reason to suspect the Independent Municipal Demarcation Authority Bill is a Trojan horse for more sinister purposes than setting municipal and ward boundaries. Whether that is true or not, the suspicions abound, as evinced by a reading of the objections to the Bill on the DearSouthAfrica.co.za public participation platform.

There are often good reasons to change a municipal boundary. For example, some residents want to be part of a municipal area with better opportunities and service delivery. But those paying rates and taxes in better-run municipalities may not want them for obvious reasons. There is a constant fear that financially distressed municipalities run into the ground by corrupt councillors and municipal managers will merge with better-resourced neighbours.




There is a crisis at the municipal level and the wards under them. The Auditor General awarded clean audits to just 16% of 257 municipalities in SA. In 2022, Ratings Afrika warned that the municipal sector was about to collapse in all but the Western Cape (where the DA has a dominant showing). This local government financial crisis has already landed at the door of the Treasury and, by extension, the taxpayer.

Shifting municipal boundaries has been a ruse employed by politicians for hundreds of years, even before the word gerrymandering entered the English vocabulary (gerrymandering is redrawing electoral boundaries to benefit a particular politician or party).




Consider this story from The Sowetan, explaining how Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB) chairperson Thabo Manyoni announced his intention to vacate his seat should he be elected as ANC chairperson in the Free State. His political ambitions are well known, having previously entered the race to unseat Ace Magashule as provincial ANC chair in the Free State.

The DA’s national spokesperson Cilliers Brink pointed to the conflict of Manyoni campaigning to become the ANC’s Free State chairperson while holding the MDB’s most senior post.

Those who see no problem with this are not paying attention or pretend there is nothing unusual going on here.




Then there’s this story where the ANC-run King Sabata Dalindyebo (KSD) Local Municipality in the Eastern Cape has ambitions of becoming a metro. It applied to the MDB to be granted metropolitan city status in 2026, but those ambitions have been waved aside by United Democratic Movement (UDM) leader Bantu Holomisa, just around the time the UDM led a march by disgruntled residents to the KSD municipal offices over poor service delivery. It turns out that KSD cannot run its affairs very well but now wants a seat with the big boys at the metro table.

“If they want a metropolitan city here, they must demonstrate by making sure that the budget the municipality gets from the central government is spent efficiently through the cleanliness of the city and better roads,” Holomisa is reported as saying.

You can see where this is all going: become a metro, bigger budget, happy cadres.

There is an existing structure known as the MDB, which was established in 1999 to determine municipal boundaries for the 1995-96 local elections. At that time, there were 1,262 local government bodies which were amalgamated into 843 local authorities, which were thereafter called municipalities. The Local Government Municipal Demarcation Act of 1998 gave birth to the Municipal Demarcation Board, which was established and mandated to demarcate municipal boundaries of the entire territory of the Republic. From the 284 municipalities in 2000, the country currently has a total of 257 municipalities after the municipal amalgamations carried out in 2006, 2011 and 2016.

According to section 24 of the Municipal Demarcation Act, boundary re-determinations should result in municipalities that fulfil the objectives laid out in the Constitution, most importantly, better service delivery.

A DMB research paper from June 2021 finds that “amalgamating municipalities did not result in improved service delivery.” Those amalgamated municipalities that were studied remained financially distressed. The authors proposed a moratorium on all amalgamations until more definitive results emerged, more education for councillors, and more thorough investigations prior to mergers.

Another DMB study into the reasons for demarcation requests shows four broad motivations: governance and functionality, the interdependence of people, communities and economies, spatial and development planning, and financial and administrative capacity.

Once enacted, the Independent Municipal Demarcation Authority Bill will replace the current Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act.

The changes it introduces empower the MDB to borrow money, generate revenue, and strengthen corporate governance. It disqualifies political party office bearers and full-time employees of organs of state from being members of the board (though it is not difficult to see how this could be side-stepped – by simply resigning a political position). The new Bill requires extensive public participation prior to demarcation and obligates the MDB to publish its reasons for any changes (not currently a requirement).

The MDB may only make boundary decisions that move a whole ward in a municipality once every ten years. If it does, the MDB must do so at least three years before the next elections. This is intended to minimise the disruptive effect of significant boundary changes.

Another major change introduced in the new Bill is the Demarcation Appeals Authority, something lacking in existing legislation. The Authority will allow aggrieved parties and communities to appeal demarcation decisions without going to court and hopefully avoid some of the violent protests that have accompanied boundary shifts in the past.

This has some positives: public participation is explicitly spelt out in the Bill, and there is an appeals process. But one should always be suspicious of those looking to move boundaries around. There is a sordid history of this, and wherever it happens in the world, it is bound to provoke conflict.




Challenge to petroleum regulations

DEARSA TAKES ACTION AGAINST REGULATIONS PROHIBITING THE SALE AND DISPENSING OF PETROL AND DIESEL INTO CONTAINERS

DearSA has instructed its attorneys to notify Minister Gwede Mantashe that should an amendment to regulations prohibiting the sale and dispensing of petrol and diesel into containers not be withdrawn, legal action will be taken.

The letter highlights adverse consequences caused by a lack of public participation in drafting the regulations and requests the amendment be reconsidered.

Although not a formal legislated requirement, the regulations were published without proper public participation or engagement with interested and affected parties. This omission is procedurally unfair, irrational and unreasonable as the amendment is not logically connected to the purpose it sets out to achieve.

“Several less restrictive and disruptive means could and should have been considered. The purported reason for the regulations is to mitigate disruptions in the supply of petrol and diesel and to prevent ‘hoarding,’ says Daniël Eloff, DearSA’s attorney.

While this rationale is understood against the current civil unrest and looting backdrop, the amendment to the regulations is not an appropriate way to achieve the purpose. Furthermore, the amendment is rushed, unrefined, not nuanced, not well thought out and, therefore, exceeds the bounds of reasonableness.

DearSA urges the Minister to repeal the amendment to the regulations. Alternatively, the amendment is rendered less restrictive by carving out a list of exceptions after giving the adequate public time to make presentations and deliver commentary on the proposed regulation.

DearSA has requested a written response to the request no later than the close of business on 19 July 2021.

Loader Loading...
EAD Logo Taking too long?
Reload Reload document
| Open Open in new tab

Download [111.13 KB]

Loader Loading...
EAD Logo Taking too long?
Reload Reload document
| Open Open in new tab

Download [140.25 KB]

DearSA opposes the nationalisation of C-19 vaccines – allowing freedom of choice

Earlier this month DearSA noted with great concern the national government’s purported prohibition on private and provincial procurement of any COVID-19 vaccines.

DearSA-vaccination

From 15 January 2021 until 28 February 2021, DearSA ran a public participation campaign regarding the national government’s COVID-19 vaccine rollout strategy. Over 17 000 South Africans participated in the process and exercised their constitutional rights within our participative constitutional democracy.

DearSA applied to be a friend of the court in the ongoing litigation regarding COVID-19 vaccine procurement in light of the participants’ comments. On 1 March 2021, DearSA’s legal team filed court papers and brought the submissions of 17 000 participants before the court, enabling their voices to be heard.

“The rollout of COVID-19 vaccines is an important issue for all South Africans insisting on a choice. We ensured that their voices are formally heard in this ground-breaking court case. DearSA will continue to ensure the voices of all South Africans are heard through our public participation platform and campaigns.” said Rob Hutchinson, executive director of DearSA.

In the government’s court papers, the Department of Health’s Director-General acknowledged that the government could not have total control over the purchase, rollout, and administering of vaccines. As a result, the private procurement of COVID-19 vaccines is not prohibited.

South Africans who participated on DearSA’s platform voiced the following major concerns regarding the government’s vaccine rollout plan:

Firstly, the government acted outside of its constitutional mandate and without an empowering provision when it prohibited the private and provincial procurement of COVID-19 vaccines. This conduct by the government was consequently ultra vires.

Secondly, centralising the procurement process creates an administrative burden for the government, slowing the rollout of vaccines and, as a consequence leaving the most vulnerable South Africans behind in vaccine distribution.

Thirdly, that allowing for the parallel procurement of vaccines in cooperation with the private sector would ensure safeguards and freedom of choice, to the benefit of all South Africans.

Lastly, a decentralised approach to vaccine procurement is the most efficient, most rapid, and allows less room for corruption.

DearSA will continue to monitor the government’s rollout plan.

Bitcoin and other crypto to be regulated

DearSA-bitcoin

by Louis Nel

Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies have come a long way. From starting out as funny internet money in 2008 to gradually capturing mainstream media attention. Suddenly even my ageing mother wants to know how to buy bitcoin. This is not without its drawbacks, as governments and regulators who wanted nothing to do with crypto also want in on the hype.

In November 2020 the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) issued a draft regulation to classify crypto assets like bitcoin as a financial product.

This means that crypto companies will have to be registered as financial service providers (FSPs) just like traditional financial service providers. This will include a whole host of products and services like exchanges, ATMs, raising business capital, investment funds, wallet apps and crypto custody companies. Where cryptocurrency itself is hard to regulate, companies are easier.

According to the FSCA, the consumer should be able to make informed decisions about companies that they choose to deal with. Recently, Mirror Trading International (MTI) made headlines about its run-ins with the FSCA. The company took bitcoin deposits on behalf of investors and promised returns of up to 10% per month. In the aftermath of MTI, the FSCA wants to make it harder for companies like this to exist in the vacuum between legislation and the rapidly advancing field of fintech.

News headlines often paint crypto as the preferred choice of criminals. in reality, the US dollar and the traditional banking system is still very much used. South Africa is part of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global watchdog against money laundering and terrorist financing. Our local legislation needs to be aligned with these international guidelines.

Regulation also forces companies to do proper due diligence on their customers, keep records of the origins of their funds and log all transactions. Where the borders of countries are blurred with crypto, this legislation will seek to carve out digital borders.

Bitcoin’s reason for existing rests on the failed policies of central banks. Existing outside of the traditional financial system is what gives bitcoin power. It is also the biggest obstacle to mass adoption and protection of consumers against scams. Since bitcoin is backed by nothing, it is a free market that decides its value. It is also decentralised so that no government can shut it down or ban it. In this Wild West of financial freedom, there is also ample scope for scammers to set up shop.

Brandon Topham, an executive at the FSCA says it best. “Regulation must be as minimal as possible to protect the public without hindering the market. Ignoring the issue is worse than over-regulating. We need to find the right balance.”

Government wants to track you from cradle to grave

By Ciaran Ryan

The government’s draft official Identity Management Policy was released on 22 December, just before Christmas.

DearSA-ID-trace

Publishing something just before Christmas is a tried and trusted tactic in the news business if you want to bury a potentially acrid story.

The Department of Home Affairs wants a new randomised ID that allows for sex alterations, links you to your parents, captures your biometric information at birth and then later in life, and all this in the interests of serving you better as a governing body.

Is it just me, or is this a tyrant’s wet dream

Reading the sales pitch for this policy document, you might think “fine, okay, I don’t really see how this will help me, but I’ll go with it.”

The document is freighted with roseate buzz words like “international best practice”, “respect for privacy” and “interoperability”.

Let’s pause right there. What is meant by “interoperability”? Essentially, gathering every bit of information possible on everyone in the country and sharing this “between identity subsystems” and other domestic and international jurisdictions.

SA’s ID system is not currently integrated and interoperable with those of other African countries and the EU, and that’s about to be rectified. Even the most venal of sins committed in SA will be shared with other jurisdictions. It’s already happened in the tax sphere, where jurisdictions share information through what is called Common Reporting Standards. In other words, South African expatriates under new rules to be introduced in March 2021 can be hunted down anywhere in the world for taxes owing.

The sharing of data between “jurisdictions” is about to get a lot more fluid. One of the justifications for this is combatting organised crime. The new draft proposal wants to capture facial and other biometrics, like fingerprints – which should make capturing criminals a doddle, right? How’s that worked out so far?

This begins to take on the vague outlines of China’s Social Credit System, where eating or playing loud music on public transit systems earn you demerit points on your social credit score, as do traffic violations, failure to sort your waste, cheating in exams, jaywalking, and cheating in online video games. Making blood donations and volunteering work hours can earn you back points. The list of potential ways to earn demerit points is too long to list here, but you can take a look yourself. It’s pretty frightening. Snitching on religious minorities is encouraged, and there’s an app to track “deadbeat debtors” – those who owe money.

Viewed through this prism, your conduct in life determines the extent to which you are declared a person or a non-person. Consider that as of June 2019, nearly 27 million Chinese citizens were denied high-speed rail tickets based on their social credit score, and by July 2019 2.56 million were denied flight tickets.

Is this what’s in store for us?

There’s been little discussion around this draft ID system – which is in itself a worry. Any proposed change in the law must be subject to rigorous cross-examination from the viewpoint of socio-economic impacts.

Anyone watching the farce of the US election – and the ability of people with no ID to vote and potentially skew an election – may be wondering what’s wrong with our system of national IDs. Americans have resisted the idea of a national ID for decades on the basis this is an infringement of privacy and Constitutional rights, though they have something approximating this in the form of a Social Security Number. Then, of course, they have state drivers’ licences. There are multiple ways to track US citizens, with or without a national ID.

It seems our elections are far more trustworthy, if only because you have to have a national ID and then register to vote.

South Africans long ago accepted the national ID as a fact of life. ID numbers were introduced under the 1950 Population Registration Act as a way of keeping tabs on different racial groups. What was an apartheid contrivance has served the ANC well, which introduced the Identification Act in 1997. The original aim of racial profiling is still very much alive today, but this new ID system will expand it well beyond that.

What’s wrong with the current system?

So, what’s wrong with the current ID system that it needs a complete overhaul?

And what kind of an overhaul is contemplated by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), the government entity responsible for ID management?

To find this out, we go to “Problem Analysis” in the draft policy document. The Identification Act is now more than 20 years old, needs modernising, will help deliver e-government and e-commerce services to those in need, and all the other motivations that typically accompanies a proposal such as this.

The Identification Act of 1997 was enacted for the purposes of maintaining a population register and to enable government to issue ID cards. Section 7 of the Act obligates the Director-General to issue ID numbers in a way that details date of birth, gender and whether a citizen of resident.

The current ID system and how it works

Here’s how it works. The existing national ID comprises a 13-digit code as follows: YYMMDDSSSSCAZ.

The first six digits represent the date of birth, and the next four digits (SSSS) are based on gender. The next digit “C” shows if you are a South African citizen – 0 being a citizen, 1 being a permanent resident.

The last digit (Z) is what is called a “checksum” which is a statistical check that the number sequence is correct.

Here’s how it will change under the proposed new system

ID numbers will be based on parents: the ID number of a child must be processed on the basis of biographic information and linked to their parents’ ID numbers and mother’s biometric data.

Recognition of other sex/gender categories – The new legislation and population register must make a provision that enables the establishment of a category that is neither male nor female.

Random unique identity number – Another option is to issue a random unique identity number that is not linked to or founded on a person’s sex/gender, date of birth, place of birth or any other marker.

Records of persons throughout their lifespan – Every birth that takes place in the country must be registered. If possible, the biometrics of children must be captured at birth. Where impossible, the biometrics of a parent must be linked to the birth certificate of a child.

Re-registration – Children must be reregistered when they reach age five with 10 fingerprints and iris and facial photographs. A combination of different biometric data for children should be considered with options such as the photograph of the ear.

The capturing and management of this data will fall under the National Identity System, or NIS, which will link with both government and non-government databases, such as banks and retailers. On the government side, health and education data will round off a near full picture of the citizen.

It’s not hard to see how the Chinese credit scoring system is but a hop, skip and a jump away for South Africans. Also linked to the NIS data are the issue of passports, immigration and refugee data. As some have remarked, it’s almost as if the Chinese government wrote the policy document for us.

The government plans to hoover up every bit of data it can on you and your children yet to be born. What’s also clear from the document is that government plans to monetise (sell) this data. This should concern us on several front: state security agencies have been implicated in extrajudicial surveillance against SA citizens, while law enforcement bodies appear to have an extremely wide interpretation of their powers under the Criminal Procedure Act to gather up cell phone subscriber records (having obtained 70,000 such records, according to Right to Know).

Where does privacy fit into this?

Section 14 of the Constitutes guarantees the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have your person or home searched; your property searched; possessions seized; or privacy of communications infringed.

Though the draft ID document makes multiple mentions of privacy, most of these relate to data privacy – but even that must be regarded with suspicion, as we have seen a number of devastating breaches of data security (and privacy) at the hands of companies like Experian. There may be severe penalties for mishandling of private data under the Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act, but that’s no guarantee of anything placed in the custody of a new, and massive, government bureaucracy.

All this is being sold to us as a way to afford rights to non-traditional gender groups, and to accelerate transformation and government services to those in need. It ticks all the right boxes. But we had better know what we are signing on to.

Have your say

Have your say on this police document here.