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2026-11-03 14:12:57 +02:00
Michael
No I do not
1. Biometric Privacy & Mass Surveillance (Sub-regulation 6A(5))
Yet more state surveillance that does nothing but punish lawful citizens. The government has proven time and again it cannot be trusted with basically anything, let alone our personal information.
2026-11-03 11:56:39 +02:00
Annede
No I do not
1. Biometric Privacy & Mass Surveillance (Sub-regulation 6A(5))
2026-11-03 06:48:22 +02:00
Shazia
No I do not
1. Biometric Privacy & Mass Surveillance (Sub-regulation 6A(5))
2026-11-02 23:08:58 +02:00
Herbert
Yes I do
1. Biometric Privacy & Mass Surveillance (Sub-regulation 6A(5))
I think it is important if the state can make sure that everyone who has a SIM card is s verified. It will help eliminate a lot fraud where people using SIM cards that are not ricad.

🟢 Arguments in Favour (What Supporters Say)

    • Eradicating SIM Fraud:
      Mandating live biometric checks against the national population register eliminates the rampant black market of pre-registered SIM cards used in syndicates, scams, and kidnappings.
    • Protecting Bank Accounts:
      Requiring strict biometric authorisation before processing any SIM swap request provides an absolute layer of defence against identity thieves trying to intercept banking OTPs.
    • Preventing Hoarding:
      With the average person only needing 2.79 numbers, the 5-number cap per network guarantees efficient management of finite national dialling codes while preventing bulk SIM purchases by illicit operators.
    • Temporary Visitor Controls:
      Cutting off foreign visitors’ SIM cards when their visa expires (or after 90 days) closes a significant loophole where tourists leave the country and their numbers are sold to criminal elements.

🔴 Arguments Against (What Opponents Say)

    • Unprecedented Privacy Risks:
      Linking commercial telecom databases continuously with the Department of Home Affairs normalises state surveillance architecture and creates catastrophic risks if network retail stores are compromised by hackers.
    • Impractical Deadlines:
      Mobile operators and civil society warn that forcing tens of millions of existing prepaid users to physically visit stores for biometric scanning within 24 months will create massive queues and operational chaos.
    • Overreliance on Failing State IT:
      Because the law mandates that SIM swaps cannot be processed without a DHA match, a simple Home Affairs server outage could cripple the digital economy and leave stranded citizens without network access.
    • Punishing the Law-Abiding:
      The regulations place heavy administrative and financial burdens on compliant citizens and network operators, while sophisticated syndicates will likely find ways to bypass biometric capture through corrupted agents or VoIP spoofing.
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