# comments2

- Link: https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/icasa-biometric-regulations/comments2/
- Published: 2026-11-02T18:31:01+02:00
- Author: dearSA

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Displaying the **15** latest comments.

[ view more ...](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/icasa-biometric-regulations/comments3/)

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support

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concern

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top-concern

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message

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2026-11-03 14:12:57 +02:00

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Michael

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No I do not

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1. Biometric Privacy & Mass Surveillance (Sub-regulation 6A(5))

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Yet more state surveillance that does nothing but punish lawful citizens. The government has proven time and again it cannot be trusted with basically anything, let alone our personal information.

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2026-11-03 11:56:39 +02:00

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Annede

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No I do not

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1. Biometric Privacy & Mass Surveillance (Sub-regulation 6A(5))

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2026-11-03 06:48:22 +02:00

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Shazia

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No I do not

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1. Biometric Privacy & Mass Surveillance (Sub-regulation 6A(5))

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2026-11-02 23:08:58 +02:00

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Herbert

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Yes I do

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1. Biometric Privacy & Mass Surveillance (Sub-regulation 6A(5))

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I think it is important if the state can make sure that everyone who has a SIM card is s verified. It will help eliminate a lot fraud where people using SIM cards that are not ricad.

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[🟢 Arguments in Favour (What Supporters Say)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/icasa-biometric-regulations/comments2/#1770892117175-dfc38055-c8382881-c4083d31-c69b)

    - _Eradicating SIM Fraud: _
       Mandating live biometric checks against the national
      population register eliminates the rampant black market of pre-registered 
      SIM cards used in syndicates, scams, and kidnappings.
    - _Protecting Bank Accounts: _
       Requiring strict biometric authorisation before
      processing any SIM swap request provides an absolute layer of defence against
      identity thieves trying to intercept banking OTPs.
    - _Preventing Hoarding: _
       With the average person only needing 2.79 numbers,
      the 5-number cap per network guarantees efficient management of finite national
      dialling codes while preventing bulk SIM purchases by illicit operators.
    - _Temporary Visitor Controls: _
       Cutting off foreign visitors’ SIM cards when
      their visa expires (or after 90 days) closes a significant loophole where 
      tourists leave the country and their numbers are sold to criminal elements.

[🔴 Arguments Against (What Opponents Say)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/icasa-biometric-regulations/comments2/#1770892117205-3c7c32e1-ce3d2881-c4083d31-c69b)

    - _Unprecedented Privacy Risks: _
       Linking commercial telecom databases continuously
      with the Department of Home Affairs normalises state surveillance architecture
      and creates catastrophic risks if network retail stores are compromised by
      hackers.
    - _Impractical Deadlines: _
       Mobile operators and civil society warn that forcing
      tens of millions of existing prepaid users to physically visit stores for 
      biometric scanning within 24 months will create massive queues and operational
      chaos.
    - _Overreliance on Failing State IT: _
       Because the law mandates that SIM swaps
      cannot be processed without a DHA match, a simple Home Affairs server outage
      could cripple the digital economy and leave stranded citizens without network
      access.
    - _Punishing the Law-Abiding: _
       The regulations place heavy administrative 
      and financial burdens on compliant citizens and network operators, while sophisticated
      syndicates will likely find ways to bypass biometric capture through corrupted
      agents or VoIP spoofing.

[ have your say](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/icasa-biometric-regulations/#havasay)