# summary

- Link: https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/
- Published: 2026-11-16T13:12:49+02:00
- Author: dearSA

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[ have your say](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/#havasay)

Following the 4 November 2026 Local Government Elections, which produced a record
wave of hung councils across South Africa—with roughly 65% of metropolitan and local
municipalities (well over 100 councils) failing to produce an outright single-party
majority—Parliament is prioritising the Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment
Bill [B23–2026], widely known as the “Coalitions Bill”.

Introduced by the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA)
as a Section 76 Bill (ordinary legislation affecting provinces and local government),
the Bill seeks to amend the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act
No. 117 of 1998) to institutionalise coalition governance. Because civil society
pressure forced Parliament to abandon an earlier attempt to rush the Bill into law
prior to election day, post-election coalition talks are still operating under the
old 14-day rules. The rules finalised through this public participation process 
will permanently govern how municipal coalitions are formed, managed, and dissolved
for the remainder of the 2026–2031 municipal term and future elections.

### _Key Proposed Statutory Changes_

[Compulsory, Gazetted Coalition Agreements (Clause 14, Section 60A)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1738150189952-44103674-e29d31d9-c3be5520-2543e016-beaa)

Parties and independent ward councillors forming a coalition in a hung council must
sign a written coalition agreement. This agreement must be submitted to the Municipal
Manager and provincial MEC, and published in the Provincial Gazette.

[12-Month "Cooling-Off" Period on Removals (Clauses 6, 8, 10, & 12)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1738150189975-5d0623dc-47dc31d9-c3be5520-2543e016-beaa)

Motions of no confidence against a Speaker, Council Whip, Executive Committee member,
or Executive Mayor/Deputy Executive Mayor may only be tabled once every 12 months.
Exceptions are strictly limited to five statutory grounds (constitutional violation,
criminal conviction, MFMA financial misconduct, serious breach of the Code of Conduct,
or inability to perform functions).

[Extended Post-Election Negotiation Windows (Clauses 3, 4, 9, & 11)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1738150854013-bb98f5fb-7d0931d9-c3be5520-2543e016-beaa)

Extends the deadline to convene the first council meeting, appoint district representatives,
and elect mayors/executive committees from 14 days to 30 days after election results
are declared.

[Discretion Over Secret Ballots (Clauses 6, 8, 10, 12, & 17)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1738151172108-10076802-4d0031d9-c3be5520-2543e016-beaa)

Empowers municipal councils to decide whether elections and removals of office bearers
happen by a show of hands or secret ballot.

[Automatic Dissolution of Mayoral Committees (Clause 13, Section 60(5))](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1794826541626-2cbbcafc-a7e8)

Clarifies that when an Executive Mayor vacates office, the entire Mayoral Committee
dissolves immediately. A new mayor must be elected within 14 days, and a new committee
appointed within 14 days thereafter.

[Opposition-Led Public Accounts Oversight (Clause 15, Section 79A)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1794826576909-e2796e79-21c6)

Mandates that the Municipal Public Accounts Committee (MPAC) Chairperson be drawn
from an opposition party or independent councillor outside the governing coalition,
and protects them from arbitrary removal without the provincial MEC’s written concurrence.

[Minimum Skills & Qualifications (Clause 2, Section 21(3))](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1794826602455-26459647-f90c)

Requires municipal office bearers and committee chairpersons to possess experience,
skills, or qualifications relevant to local government, or be capacitated to perform
their functions.

### _Questions and answers_

[Why is this Bill so urgent right after the November 2026 local elections?](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1763554389233-fdb8fee6-6da45520-2543e016-beaa)

The 4 November 2026 municipal elections produced roughly 65% hung councils across
metropolitan and local municipalities—meaning over 100 councils have no single ruling
party. Although Parliament abandoned an earlier bid to rush this Bill into law before
election day following civil society pushback, the Portfolio Committee on COGTA 
is actively deliberating on the Bill now. The rules finalised through this public
participation process will govern how coalitions are formed, managed, and dissolved
for the remainder of the 2026–2031 municipal term and future elections.

[What happens if parties in a hung council refuse to sign a coalition agreement?](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1763554389265-aa09206a-77665520-2543e016-beaa)

Under Clause 14 (proposed Section 60A), entering into a signed, written coalition
agreement is mandatory for parties and independent ward councillors forming a coalition
in a hung council. Once signed, it must be lodged with the Municipal Manager, sent
to the provincial MEC for local government, and published in the Provincial Gazette.
Any subsequent changes to the deal must also be gazetted. If a party governs via
a minority arrangement without a formal coalition, it remains subject to council
voting rules without the contractual framework of Section 60A.

[Does the 12-month rule mean a corrupt or criminal mayor cannot be removed?](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1763554389298-fbc55a3c-817c5520-2543e016-beaa)

**No**. Clauses 6, 8, 10, and 12 establish a 12-month “cooling-off” period during
which only one ordinary motion of no confidence may be tabled against a Speaker,
Whip, Executive Committee member, or Executive Mayor. However, a removal motion 
can be brought at any time if it is based on five specific grounds: (a) violating
the Constitution, (b) a criminal conviction (including under corruption laws), (
c) financial misconduct under the MFMA, (d) a serious breach of the Councillor Code
of Conduct, or (e) an inability to perform the legislated functions of office. Critics
warn that proving “inability to perform” or waiting for a criminal conviction still
makes timely political accountability exceptionally difficult.

[How does the Bill affect independent ward councillors?](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1771840733358-e4b2d08e-b226e016-beaa)

The Bill formally inserts a statutory definition of an “independent ward councillor”
into the Municipal Structures Act (Clause 1) and explicitly includes independents
alongside political parties in coalition agreements (Section 60A) and Whip oversight
duties (Section 41B). Independent councillors who are not part of the governing 
coalition are also eligible to chair the Municipal Public Accounts Committee (Section
79A). However, citizens must remain vigilant that electoral thresholds are not re-
inserted during committee deliberations, which would sideline independents and smaller
parties.

[Why does the Bill extend the post-election deadline from 14 days to 30 days?](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1771840767171-e194ee95-bf82e016-beaa)

Previously, councils had just 14 days after election results were declared to hold
their inaugural meeting, elect a Speaker and Mayor, and appoint district representatives—
often leading to chaotic, overnight deals driven by cabinet-post horse-trading rather
than service delivery plans. Clauses 3, 4, 9, and 11 extend these deadlines to 30
days to allow structured, transparent negotiations. Conversely, if a Mayor vacates
office mid-term, Clause 13 mandates that a new Mayor be elected within 14 days and
a new Mayoral Committee appointed within 14 days thereafter to avoid administrative
vacuums.

[Did the government properly assess the financial and constitutional impact of this Bill?](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1794827514617-ce4de144-43f4)

**No**. In its Final Socio-Economic Impact Assessment System (SEIAS) Report (dated
25 June 2026), COGTA failed to tick “Yes” on whether the Bill is constitutional (
leaving Part 3, Section 8a blank), claimed there were “None” (zero) stakeholder 
disagreements despite documented objections from research institutes like PARI and
ACCORD, and budgeted R0 (“None”) for implementation—even though councils will face
new legal drafting fees, Provincial Gazette publication costs, and mandatory councillor
capacitation requirements. Most concerningly, the SEIAS report states that citizens’
behaviour of “spreading votes amongst a magnitude of political parties” is a problem
that “must be changed”—blaming voters rather than fixing political party accountability.

[Does this Bill introduce a minimum vote threshold (e.g., 1% or 2%) to get into council?](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1794826784342-a65858ba-cd96)

Not in the currently tabled text [B23–2026]. State Law Advisers flagged constitutional
concerns that electoral thresholds could infringe on proportional representation.
However, senior members of the COGTA Portfolio Committee have publicly stated that
Parliament intends to revisit the threshold debate during public hearings. Submitting
your view now places public opposition or support for thresholds directly on the
official parliamentary record.

[Does Parliament legally have to consider my submission?](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1794826811604-89edbe5b-2819)

**Yes**. Under Sections 59(1)(a) and 72(1)(a) of the Constitution, both the National
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) are constitutionally obligated
to facilitate meaningful public involvement in their legislative processes. Because
this is a **Section 76 Bill** affecting provincial and local governance, it must
pass through both houses of Parliament and provincial legislatures. Furthermore,
under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) and Constitutional Court
precedent (Doctors for Life), lawmakers cannot treat public participation as a rubber-
stamping exercise—they must apply their minds to substantive, individualized submissions.
Unlike online petitions, which Parliament logs as a single collective signature,
Dear South Africa delivers your unique submission directly to the Portfolio Committee
on COGTA as an independent, legally recognised representation.

The Municipal Structures Amendment Bill

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The SEIAS report

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### _The Government’s Impact Assessment (SEIAS) Explained_

Before any Bill is introduced into Parliament, the sponsoring department must complete
a Socio-Economic Impact Assessment System (SEIAS) report to prove that the proposed
law is constitutional, financially costed, and backed by evidence.

For the Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill [B23–2026], the Department
of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) submitted its Final SEIAS
Report (Phase 2) on 25 June 2026. Reading the Department’s own official impact assessment
reveals major administrative gaps, unfunded mandates, and troubling assumptions 
about South African voters that you can cite directly in your submission.

[1. COGTA Blames Voters for Hung Councils ("Behavioural Change" Table, Section 2.2)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1794829144451-e895254b-da1e)

    - _What the SEIAS Report Says:_
       In Section 2.2 (“What and whose behaviour does
      the proposal seek to change?”), COGTA explicitly identifies “Communities” 
      as a group whose behaviour “must be changed”, defining the problematic community
      behaviour as “The spreading of votes amongst a number / magnitude of political
      parties contesting municipal elections”.
    - _Why This Matters to You:_
       In a constitutional multi-party democracy, citizens
      have a fundamental right to vote for whichever party or independent ward councillor
      best represents their community. Rather than requiring political parties to
      mature into coalition governance, COGTA’s official policy document treats 
      voters exercising democratic choice as a socio-economic problem to be corrected.

[2. R0 Budgeted for Implementation & Councillor Capacitation (Sections 2.5, 6, & Part 3.4)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1794829144509-84eeaa60-0eb5)

    - _What the SEIAS Report Says:_
       * Section 2.5 admits that the Bill creates new implementation and compliance
         costs for councils and political parties—specifically “the capacitation
         of municipal office bearer[s] or chairperson[s]” (required under Clause
         2), “legal costs” for drafting binding coalition agreements, and “publication”
         costs in the Provincial Gazette.
       * Yet in Section 6(a) (Medium-Term Expenditure Framework budgets), Section
         6(b) (Human Resource Plan staffing), and Part 3, Question 4 (“Summarise
         the cost to government in terms of budgetary outlays and institutional 
         capacity”), COGTA writes “None”.
    - _Why This Matters to You:_
       Passing unfunded statutory mandates onto already
      financially distressed municipalities means ratepayers will ultimately absorb
      the unbudgeted legal, training, and administrative costs.

[3. Missing Constitutional Verification & Ignored Objections (Section 2.3(b) & Part 3.8(a))](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1794829144578-dd0fd617-fc2d)

    - _What the SEIAS Report Says:_
       * In Part 3, Question 8(a), which asks “Is the proposal Constitutional?”,
         COGTA left both the “Yes” and “No” boxes completely blank.
       * In Section 2.3(b), asking for a summary of the main disagreements raised
         by stakeholders and experts, COGTA wrote “None”—even though its own consultation
         table on the preceding pages documents substantive warnings from the Public
         Affairs Research Institute (PARI) (warning that open voting intimidates
         councillors of conscience) and ACCORD (warning that show-of-hands voting
         undermines secret-ballot protections under the African Charter on Democracy,
         Elections and Governance and SADC election guidelines).
       * Meanwhile, the report confirms that on 27 May 2026, the Office of the Chief
         State Law Adviser (OCSLA) forced COGTA to strip out earlier electoral threshold
         clauses because they violate Sections 158 and 160(8) of the Constitution.
    - _Why This Matters to You:_An impact assessment that leaves its constitutional
      sign-off blank and erases documented expert objections fails the basic standards
      of rational, transparent lawmaking required under Section 195 of the Constitution
      and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).

[4. Toothless Dispute Resolution for "Binding" Contracts (Section 8(c))](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1794829144646-ac17c101-cf11)

    - _What the SEIAS Report Says:_
       While Clause 14 turns coalition agreements 
      into legally binding contracts, COGTA’s risk matrix in Section 8(c) acknowledges
      that “Disagreements between political parties (either on policy matters, positions/
      leadership)” are a major risk. However, the only dispute-resolution mechanism
      listed is “Resilient engagements with political parties, to sensitise them
      about the prescribed timeframes”.
    - _Why This Matters to You:_
       Making coalition pacts legally binding without
      an accessible, low-cost arbitration mechanism means routine political disputes
      will spill into expensive High Court litigation funded by municipal coffers—
      freezing council administration even further.

[SEIAS Audit at a Glance (For Quick Reference)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1794829144714-d661b195-71ba)

  |  **SEIAS Report Section (25 June 2026)** |  **Official COGTA Entry** |  **Practical & Constitutional Reality** |  
   |

**Section 2.2:** Behaviour that _“must be changed”_

  |

_“Communities: The spreading of votes amongst a number / magnitude of political parties”_

  |

Blames citizens for exercising multi-party democratic choice rather than holding politicians accountable.

  |  
 |

**Section 6 & Part 3.4:** Budgetary & HR Cost to Government

  |

**“None”**

  |

R0 allocated despite new legal drafting, _Provincial Gazette_ notices, and mandatory councillor training.

  |  
 |

**Part 3, Q8(a):** _“Is the proposal Constitutional?”_

  |

**Left completely blank** (neither Yes nor No ticked)

  |

Fails to certify constitutionality even after OCSLA struck down earlier electoral thresholds as unconstitutional.

  |  
 |

**Section 2.3(b):** Summary of stakeholder disagreements

  |

**“None”**

  |

Contradicts COGTA’s own table recording objections from PARI and ACCORD over voting secrecy and intimidation.

  |  
 |

**Section 8(c):** Coalition dispute-resolution mechanism

  |

_“Resilient engagements… to sensitise”_ parties

  |

No statutory mediation or arbitration—leaving deadlocked councils to fight in the High Court.

  |

[Ready-to-Use Paragraph for Your Submission](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/#1794829144774-eee16e7a-a06b)

If you wish to reference the SEIAS report in your comment box on the Dear South 
Africa form, you can copy, adapt, or build on this text:

_“I object to Parliament processing the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill [B23–
2026] on the basis of COGTA’s defective Final SEIAS Report (dated 25 June 2026).
The Department’s impact assessment allocates zero budgetary or human-resource provisions
for mandatory councillor capacitation and legal compliance (Section 6 & Part 3.4),
leaves the constitutional verification box blank (Part 3, Question 8a), omits documented
expert disagreements (Section 2.3b), and improperly classifies citizens distributing
their votes across multiple parties as a ‘behaviour that must be changed’ (Section
2.2). Under Section 195 of the Constitution and PAJA, Parliament must require a 
properly costed, constitutionally verified impact assessment before enacting legislation
that restricts democratic accountability in local councils.”_

### _In the News_

    - Mail & Guardian — [Municipal Coalitions Bill – Why it is important](https://mg.co.za/thought-leader/2026-11-08-municipal-coalitions-bill-why-it-is-important/)
    - EWN — [Frolick warns against rushing municipal coalitions bill, citing unconstitutional shortcuts](https://www.ewn.co.za/2026/11/12/frolick-warns-against-rushing-municipal-coalitions-bill-citing-unconstitutional-shortcuts)
    - Parliament — [Media Statement: COGTA Committee to Set Out Next Steps for Processing Coalitions Bill](https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/media-statement-cogta-committee-set-out-next-steps-processing-coalitions-bill)
    - The Mercury —[ Experts question whether 14 days is enough for municipal coalition talks](https://themercury.co.za/news/2026-11-16-experts-question-whether-14-days-is-enough-for-municipal-coalition-talks/)
    - IOL — [Coalitions Bill targets no-confidence motions and council delays](https://iol.co.za/capeargus/news/2026-11-13-coalitions-bill-targets-no-confidence-motions-and-council-delays/)
    - BusinessTech — [New coalition and finance laws for South Africa are coming](https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/884247/new-coalition-and-finance-laws-for-south-africa-are-coming/)
    - Daily Maverick — [Over 100 hung councils, 14 days: A negotiator’s rulebook for coalitions that last](https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2026-11-08-over-100-hung-councils-14-days-a-negotiators-rulebook-for-coalitions-that-last/)

**SABC News.** House Chairperson of the National Assembly Cedric Frolick has tempered
expectations about the Local Government Municipal Structures Amendment Bill, widely
known as the Coalition Bill, saying it would be impossible to finalise it before
coalition negotiations are concluded. The Bill was brought to Parliament with too
little time to be finalised before the elections.

**SABC News.** With the November local government elections approaching, questions
remain over whether the Coalitions Bill can be passed in time, and whether legislation
can bring stability to hung councils. Joining us to talk about the Bill, its implications
for smaller parties, and what voters should watch out for is independent elections
analyst, Mike Atkins

**Radio 702.** Jane Dutton speaks to University of the Witwatersrand School of Governance,
Public and Development Management, Associate Professor Prof William Gumede about
the importance of the Municipal Coalitions Bill .

**SABC News.** Unpacking the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill

### _Statements and media releases_

Click on a logo to view.

Want to display your organisation’s statement? [Click here. ](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary/ cannabis@dearsouthafrica.co.za?subject=org info for Cannabis regulations info page)

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### Cape Independence Party

 **CAPEXIT Party strongly opposes the Business Licensing Bill in its entirety on
all points:**

**Preferential licensing**
 The Bill explicitly empowers the Minister to grant licences
on a “preferential” basis and to impose conditions that advance “historically disadvantaged
individuals” or other designated groups. This is nothing less than state-sanctioned
racial and ideological discrimination dressed up as transformation policy.

CAPEXIT rejects the notion that the state has any legitimate role in deciding which
racial or social group may or may not operate a business. Such preferential licensing
will:

    - Reintroduce apartheid-era economic controls under a new ideological banner;
    - Create a cronyist system where access to markets is determined by political
      connections and demographic criteria rather than merit, innovation or consumer
      demand;
    - Discourage both domestic and foreign investment, as investors will rightly
      fear that their businesses can be denied licences or subjected to arbitrary
      conditions on racial or political grounds.

No free society licenses businesses on the basis of the owner’s skin colour or historical
narrative. This clause alone renders the entire Bill unconstitutional and morally
indefensible.

**Principles of business licensing**
 The Bill fails to articulate any coherent,
objective, or proportionate principle for requiring a general business licence in
the first place. Instead, it presumes that every enterprise – from a street vendor
to a multinational corporation – must seek prior permission from the state simply
to exist and trade.

This reverses the fundamental principle of a free economy: citizens should be free
to engage in lawful economic activity without state permission unless there is a
clear, evidence-based justification (e.g. public health, safety or environmental
protection).

The Bill provides no such justification. It is a blanket assault on economic freedom,
reminiscent of the licence-permit raj that crippled India’s economy for decades.
Requiring a general “business licence” in addition to existing sector-specific permits(
liquor, health, zoning, etc.) serves no legitimate public purpose – only the purpose
of expanding state control and creating new opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption.

**Powers of inspectors**
 The Bill grants inspectors extraordinarily broad and invasive
powers, including warrantless entry into private premises, seizure of documents 
and goods, and the ability to close businesses on the spot. These powers are ripe
for abuse and will be weaponised against political opponents, non-compliant businesses,
and any entrepreneur who refuses to pay bribes.

In a country already plagued by corruption scandals, handing unelected officials
the power to enter and shut down businesses without judicial oversight is an open
invitation to extortion. Small businesses, spaza shops, and informal traders – many
of them immigrant-owned – will be particularly vulnerable to harassment and shakedowns.
Far from promoting transformation, this will simply create a new class of “licence
inspectors” who enrich themselves at the expense of the poor.

**More red tape**
 South Africa already ranks poorly on the World Bank’s Ease of
Doing Business index, largely because of regulatory overreach. This Bill adds yet
another layer of costly, time-consuming bureaucracy on top of SARS registration,
municipal permits, B-BBEE compliance, UIF, COIDA, sector SETA requirements, and 
dozens of other licences.

The compliance costs – application fees, mandatory consultations, endless paperwork,
and the risk of arbitrary refusal – will crush startups and force thousands of small
businesses to close or remain informal. Jobs will be lost, investment will flee,
and the tax base will shrink. The Western Cape, which has consistently outperformed
the rest of South Africa precisely because of lighter and more efficient regulation,
will see its competitive advantage deliberately sabotaged by Pretoria.

**Conclusion**
 The Business Licensing Bill is not reform – it is economic sabotage.
It centralises power in the hands of an already overreaching and underperforming
national government, reintroduces racial criteria into commerce, and erects new 
barriers to entrepreneurship at a time when South Africa desperately needs growth
and jobs.

CAPEXIT calls for the complete withdrawal of this Bill. The people of the Western
Cape, and indeed all South Africans who believe in freedom, will not accept a return
to a permit-based economy controlled by bureaucrats and political gatekeepers.

For a free, prosperous, and non-racial future, this Bill must be rejected in its
entirety.
