# comments

- Link: https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/comments/
- Published: 2026-11-16T14:48:58+02:00
- Author: dearSA

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Displaying the **5** latest comments.

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Submitted

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first-name

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support

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concern

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top-concern

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message

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2026-11-17 01:07:00 +02:00

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Hill

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No I do not

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All of the above

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7. General Support for Transparency, Negotiation Windows & Oversight

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I support the core transparency and governance reforms in the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill [B23–2026], specifically the mandatory publication of signed coalition agreements in the Provincial Gazette (Section 60A), the extension of post-election negotiation deadlines from 14 to 30 days, the automatic dissolution and prompt replacement of Mayoral Committees when a mayor vacates office (Section 60(5)), and the requirement that Municipal Public Accounts Committees be chaired by non-coalition opposition or independent councillors (Section 79A).

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2026-11-17 01:05:25 +02:00

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Hill

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No I do not

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All of the above

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6. Unfunded Mandates & Flawed Impact Assessment (COGTA SEIAS Report Defects)

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I draw the Committee’s attention to critical administrative defects in COGTA’s Final SEIAS Report (dated 25 June 2026). The Department’s impact assessment allocates zero budgetary or human-resource provisions for councillor capacitation and legal compliance, fails to confirm the Bill’s constitutionality in Part 3 (Section 8a), and improperly characterises citizens exercising their multi-party democratic right to distribute votes across smaller parties as a ‘behaviour that must be changed’ (Section 2.2). Under Section 195 of the Constitution and PAJA, Parliament cannot enact legislation predicated on an incomplete impact assessment that seeks to engineer voter behaviour rather than enforce executive accountability.

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2026-11-17 01:04:06 +02:00

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Hill

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No I do not

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All of the above

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5. Threat of Electoral Thresholds Being Re-inserted

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I strongly oppose any attempt by the Portfolio Committee on COGTA to re-insert minimum electoral thresholds into the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill during public deliberations. As confirmed by the Office of the Chief State Law Adviser, electoral thresholds violate Sections 158 and 160(8) of the Constitution, undermine proportional representation under Section 157, and disenfranchise voters who support smaller civic parties and independent ward councillors.

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2026-11-17 01:02:38 +02:00

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Hill

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No I do not

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4. Vague Competency & Qualification Gatekeeping

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While I support professionalising local government, Clause 2 (proposed Section 21(3)) introduces vague, undefined requirements that office bearers and committee chairs possess ‘relevant experience, skills or qualifications.’ Without objective statutory benchmarks or an independent verification mechanism, this clause invites subjective, partisan gatekeeping to disqualify legitimate opposition and independent councillors.

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2026-11-17 01:01:19 +02:00

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Hill

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No I do not

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All of the above

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3. Secret Ballots vs. Voter Accountability

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I object to provisions in Clauses 6, 8, 10, 12, and 17 that permit municipal councils to elect or remove office bearers via secret ballot. Ratepayers have a democratic right under Section 195 of the Constitution to know how their elected councillors vote on executive leadership. Secret ballots shield councillors from voter accountability and enable clandestine backroom deal-making. Council votes on office bearers must be conducted openly by a recorded show of hands or roll-call vote.

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[🟢 Arguments in Favour (What Supporters Say)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/comments/#1770892117175-dfc38055-c8382881-c4089f62-b03b)

    - _Ending “Revolving-Door” Mayors & Service Collapse: _
       Since 2016, major metros
      like Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, and Nelson Mandela Bay have cycled
      through mayors every few months. Supporters argue that endless motions of 
      no confidence halt budgets, stall capital projects, and leave residents without
      water or electricity while councillors trade positions.
    - _Bringing Secret Deals into the Sunlight: _
       Currently, coalition pacts are
      often treated as private party documents hidden from voters. Requiring every
      coalition agreement (and any amendment) to be published in the Provincial 
      Gazette allows ratepayers and civil society to hold coalition partners directly
      accountable for broken promises.
    - _Protecting Public Watchdogs (MPACs): _
       Governing coalitions frequently capture
      Municipal Public Accounts Committees to bury irregular expenditure. Mandating
      that the MPAC Chairperson come from an opposition party or non-coalition independent
      councillor—and protecting them from arbitrary firing—restores genuine financial
      oversight.
    - _Realistic Negotiation Timeframes: _
       Expanding the post-election window from
      14 days to 30 days stops rushed, panic-driven coalitions and gives parties
      time to negotiate coherent service delivery programmes rather than merely 
      dividing up mayoral committee seats.

[🔴 Arguments Against (What Opponents Say)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/comments/#1770892117205-3c7c32e1-ce3d2881-c4089f62-b03b)

    - _Insulating Incompetence for a Full Year: _
       Civil society watchdogs (such
      as My Vote Counts) and governance analysts warn that stability is not an end
      in itself. Freezing motions of no confidence for 12 months—unless a leader
      commits a crime or violates the Constitution—means ratepayers are stuck with
      an ineffective or paralysed mayor for an entire budget cycle.
    - _Centralising Control in Pretoria: _
       Allowing the national Minister of COGTA
      to dictate the structure and dispute-resolution rules of local coalition agreements
      encroaches on the constitutional autonomy of local government (Section 151
      of the Constitution) and creates an opening for national political interference
      in local councils.
    - _Undermining Representative Accountability via Secret Ballots: _
       Voters elect
      councillors to take public stances on who governs their town. Permitting councils
      to vote by secret ballot on mayors and speakers removes transparency, making
      it impossible for citizens to know whether their ward councillor honoured 
      their mandate or sold their vote.
    - _Creating Unworkable Legal Deadlocks: _
       Making coalition agreements legally
      binding contracts enforceable through prescribed dispute mechanisms risks 
      turning routine political disagreements into protracted High Court battles
      that freeze municipal administration even further.
    - _Flawed Policy Foundation & Unfunded Mandates: _
       COGTA’s own Final SEIAS 
      Report (25 June 2026) budgets R0 (“None”) for councillor capacitation and 
      legal compliance, leaves the constitutional verification box blank, and improperly
      blames voters for “spreading votes amongst a magnitude of political parties”
      rather than addressing political party misconduct.

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