# Coalitions Bill

- Link: https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/
- Published: 2026-11-16T12:50:32+02:00
- Author: dearSA

![Have your say on The Municipal Structures Amendment Bill (Coalitions Bill)](https://
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0

comments individually delivered to the Minister

       * No I do not support the Bill 52
       * Yes I do 1
       * Not fully 4

### The Portfolio Committee on Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs invites stakeholders and interested individuals to submit written comments on the Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill (B23-2026).

Following the 4 November 2026 Local Government Elections, which produced a record
wave of hung councils across South Africa—with roughly 65% of metropolitan and local
municipalities (well over 100 councils) failing to produce an outright single-party
majority—Parliament is prioritising what is widely known as the “Coalitions Bill”

The Bill seeks to institutionalise and regulate coalition governments to end the“
revolving-door” instability, opportunistic motions of no confidence, and service
delivery paralysis that have plagued hung municipalities since 2016. Because Parliament
halted an earlier attempt to rush the Bill through before the November elections,
current post-election coalition talks are still operating under the old 14-day rules
and non-binding COGTA guidelines (published on 10 November 2026), making public 
participation right now critical to shaping the permanent law that will govern these
councils for the rest of the 2026–2031 term.
 click the link for more info, or scroll
down to have your say

[ view info, statements, documents and videos](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary)

### _Where Do You Stand?_

🔴 I OBJECT to the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill in its current form_ (I oppose
restricting council accountability through 12-month removal bans, granting national
ministerial control over local coalitions, and leaving loopholes for secret ballots
or vague qualification gatekeeping)._

🟡 I AMEND / NOT FULLY _(I support mandatory public gazetting of coalition agreements
and independent opposition-led MPACs, but demand the removal of the 12-month no-
confidence freeze, tighter limits on national ministerial regulations, and mandatory
open voting)._

🟢 I SUPPORT the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill as published _(I support establishing
binding, gazetted coalition contracts, extending post-election negotiation windows
to 30 days, and curbing destabilising motions of no confidence to restore municipal
service delivery)._

## 󠀁[ view comments from other participants before you have a say](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/comments)󠁿

**Do you support the Do you support the Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment
Bill as proposed by the Minister? **

**What is your concern? (scroll down for an explanation of each) **

As you've chosen "all of the above", if you had to settle on a single top concern,
what would it be?

the fields below are optional ——————————

**What is your preferred channel for feedback on this campaign?**

**Your preferred language?**

**What is your status? (for our reporting purposes only) **

 **Check your email address then hit send! You will be redirected to a confirmation
page. **

![D-icon](https://cdn.dearsouthafrica.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/11192438/
D-icon-40x40-1.png "D-icon-40x40")

### _Top concerns_

[1. The 12-Month Accountability Shield (Clauses 6, 8, 10, & 12)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/#1770131112026-5a70eb21-10f15d6a-e1cd1d69-949086db-d4ddbdcb-dc45)

    - _The Core Risk & Impact: _
       The Bill imposes a mandatory 12-month “cooling-
      off” period on motions of no confidence against a municipality’s Speaker (
      Section 40), Council Whip (Section 41E), Executive Committee members (Section
      53), and Executive Mayor or Deputy Executive Mayor (Section 58). Within that
      12-month cycle, an office bearer can only be removed if a council proves one
      of five narrow legal thresholds (constitutional violation, criminal conviction,
      MFMA financial misconduct, serious Code of Conduct breach, or inability to
      perform functions). While aimed at stopping frivolous leadership changes, 
      legal analysts and governance watchdogs warn that this turns coalition stability
      into guaranteed job security—trapping ratepayers and elected councillors under
      an incompetent, obstructive, or underperforming mayor for an entire municipal
      budget year.

_Suggested Submission Wording: _
 _“I object to Clauses 6, 8, 10, and 12 of the 
Bill, which restrict motions of no confidence against municipal office bearers to
once every 12 months. Insulating an Executive Mayor, Speaker, or Whip from political
removal for a full year—unless a criminal conviction or formal constitutional breach
is already proven—strips elected councillors of their primary oversight tool under
Section 160 of the Constitution and leaves ratepayers trapped under failing administrations.”_

[National Ministerial Overreach into Local Coalitions (Clause 14, Section 60A(3) & Clause 16)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/#1770131112043-0e75ef86-4b6c5d6a-e1cd1d69-949086db-d4ddbdcb-dc45)

    - _The Core Risk & Impact: _
       Proposed Section 60A(3) empowers the national 
      Minister of COGTA to prescribe by regulation “the form and manner in which
      a coalition agreement may be concluded, including dispute resolution mechanisms”.
      Under Section 151 of the Constitution, local government is a distinct, autonomous
      sphere of government—not an administrative branch of a national ministry. 
      Allowing a national cabinet minister to dictate how local councils structure
      and resolve political partnerships invites centralised political interference
      in opposition-led or multi-party councils. Furthermore, turning political 
      agreements into rigid contracts governed by ministerial dispute rules risks
      dragging routine municipal disagreements into protracted High Court litigation,
      especially when COGTA’s own SEIAS risk matrix offers no practical arbitration
      mechanism beyond “sensitising” parties.

_Suggested Submission Wording: _
 _“I object to proposed Section 60A(3), which empowers
the national Minister of COGTA to prescribe the form, manner, and dispute-resolution
mechanisms for local coalition agreements. Granting a national cabinet minister 
regulatory control over local political partnerships encroaches on the constitutional
autonomy of municipalities under Section 151 of the Constitution and invites national
political interference into local governance.”_

[3. Secret Ballots vs. Voter Accountability (Clauses 6, 8, 10, 12, & 17)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/#1770131281853-5866958a-b51c5d6a-e1cd1d69-949086db-d4ddbdcb-dc45)

    - _The Core Risk & Impact: _
       Clauses 6, 8, 10, 12, and 17 (amending Schedule
      3) codify that the election and removal of a Speaker, Whip, Executive Committee
      member, or Executive Mayor may be conducted “by show of hands or secret ballot,
      as decided by the municipal council”. Voters elect ward and proportional representation
      councillors to represent their mandate openly on the council floor. When a
      council votes by secret ballot to install or remove an Executive Mayor, ratepayers
      have zero visibility into whether their councillor honoured their election
      promises or secretly traded their vote in a backroom deal. Secret ballots 
      in municipal councils shield councillors from electoral consequences and enable
      clandestine floor-crossing behaviour.

_Suggested Submission Wording: _
 _“I object to provisions in Clauses 6, 8, 10, 
12, and 17 that permit municipal councils to elect or remove office bearers via 
secret ballot. Ratepayers have a democratic right under Section 195 of the Constitution
to know how their elected councillors vote on executive leadership. Secret ballots
shield councillors from voter accountability and enable clandestine backroom deal-
making. Council votes on office bearers must be conducted openly by a recorded show
of hands or roll-call vote.”_

[4. Vague Competency & Qualification Gatekeeping (Clause 2, Section 21(3))](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/#1770131323251-266a4851-6c9c5d6a-e1cd1d69-949086db-d4ddbdcb-dc45)

    - _The Core Risk & Impact: _
       Clause 2 (proposed Section 21(3)) stipulates that
      any councillor elected as a municipal office bearer or committee chairperson“
      must possess the experience, skills or qualifications relevant to local government
      or be capacitated to perform such functions optimally”. However, the Bill 
      fails to define what constitutes “relevant experience, skills or qualifications”
      or who adjudicates whether a councillor is sufficiently “capacitated”. Without
      objective, non-partisan statutory criteria, this vague wording invites subjective
      political gatekeeping to disqualify legitimate opposition councillors or independent
      ward representatives from chairing oversight committees or holding office.

_Suggested Submission Wording: _
 _“While I support professionalising local government,
Clause 2 (proposed Section 21(3)) introduces vague, undefined requirements that 
office bearers and committee chairs possess ‘relevant experience, skills or qualifications.’
Without objective statutory benchmarks or an independent verification mechanism,
this clause invites subjective, partisan gatekeeping to disqualify legitimate opposition
and independent councillors.”_

[5. Threat of Electoral Thresholds Being Re-inserted](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/#1777463528421-99209505-be9a1d69-949086db-d4ddbdcb-dc45)

    - _The Core Risk & Impact: _
       An earlier pre-tabling draft of the Coalitions
      Bill proposed mandatory electoral thresholds (requiring political parties 
      to win a minimum percentage of votes to qualify for council seats or coalition
      executives). Although the Office of the Chief State Law Adviser (OCSLA) forced
      the removal of threshold clauses on 27 May 2026 because they violate Sections
      158 and 160(8) of the Constitution, senior leadership within Parliament’s 
      Portfolio Committee on COGTA explicitly stated during briefings that Parliament
      intends to revisit thresholds during public deliberations. Following the 4
      November 2026 elections, smaller community-based parties, ratepayer movements,
      and independent ward councillors hold the balance of power in dozens of hung
      councils; re-introducing thresholds would disenfranchise their voters and 
      undermine proportional representation.

_Suggested Submission Wording: 
 “I strongly oppose any attempt by the Portfolio
Committee on COGTA to re-insert minimum electoral thresholds into the Municipal 
Structures Amendment Bill during public deliberations. As confirmed by the Office
of the Chief State Law Adviser, electoral thresholds violate Sections 158 and 160(
8) of the Constitution, undermine proportional representation under Section 157,
and disenfranchise voters who support smaller civic parties and independent ward
councillors.”

[6. Unfunded Mandates & Flawed Impact Assessment (COGTA SEIAS Report Defects)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/#1777463564023-1723eae7-45f61d69-949086db-d4ddbdcb-dc45)

    - _The Core Risk & Impact: _
       COGTA’s own Final Socio-Economic Impact Assessment
      System (SEIAS) Report (dated 25 June 2026) exposes severe administrative flaws.
      Despite mandating councillor capacitation, legal drafting, and Provincial 
      Gazette publication of coalition agreements across dozens of hung councils,
      COGTA budgets R0 (“None”) in the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
      and Human Resource Plans. Even more alarmingly, COGTA left the “Constitutional?”
      verification box blank in Part 3 (Section 8a), falsely claimed there were “
      None” (zero) stakeholder disagreements despite documented objections from 
      PARI and ACCORD, and explicitly classified “Communities spreading their votes
      amongst a number / magnitude of political parties” as a voter behaviour that“
      must be changed”.

_Suggested Submission Wording: 
 “I draw the Committee’s attention to critical administrative
defects in COGTA’s Final SEIAS Report (dated 25 June 2026). The Department’s impact
assessment allocates zero budgetary or human-resource provisions for councillor 
capacitation and legal compliance, fails to confirm the Bill’s constitutionality
in Part 3 (Section 8a), and improperly characterises citizens exercising their multi-
party democratic right to distribute votes across smaller parties as a ‘behaviour
that must be changed’ (Section 2.2). Under Section 195 of the Constitution and PAJA,
Parliament cannot enact legislation predicated on an incomplete impact assessment
that seeks to engineer voter behaviour rather than enforce executive accountability.”

[7. General Support for Transparency, Negotiation Windows & Oversight (Clauses 3, 4, 9, 11, 13, 14, & 15)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/#1794828170695-7e4ba837-3444)

    - _Why Choose This Option: _
       Select this option if you broadly support the 
      Bill’s core governance reforms—specifically mandatory publication of coalition
      agreements in the Provincial Gazette (Section 60A), extending post-election
      negotiation windows from 14 to 30 days (Clauses 3, 4, 9, & 11), immediate 
      dissolution and prompt replacement of Mayoral Committees when a mayor vacates
      office (Section 60(5)), and requiring Municipal Public Accounts Committees(
      MPACs) to be chaired by non-coalition opposition or independent councillors(
      Section 79A).

_Suggested Submission Wording: 
 “I support the core transparency and governance
reforms in the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill [B23–2026], specifically the 
mandatory publication of signed coalition agreements in the Provincial Gazette (
Section 60A), the extension of post-election negotiation deadlines from 14 to 30
days, the automatic dissolution and prompt replacement of Mayoral Committees when
a mayor vacates office (Section 60(5)), and the requirement that Municipal Public
Accounts Committees be chaired by non-coalition opposition or independent councillors(
Section 79A).”

### _Perspectives: What is the debate?_

The November 2026 local elections confirmed that coalition governance is no longer
an exception—it is the permanent reality for the majority of South Africa’s metros
and local towns. The debate over Bill [B23–2026] centres on a fundamental constitutional
tension: how to engineer administrative stability without suffocating democratic
accountability.

[🟢 Arguments in Favour (What Supporters Say)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/#1770892117175-dfc38055-c8385d6a-e1cd1d69-949086db-d4ddbdcb-dc45)

    - _Ending “Revolving-Door” Mayors & Service Collapse: _
       Since 2016, major metros
      like Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, and Nelson Mandela Bay have cycled
      through mayors every few months. Supporters argue that endless motions of 
      no confidence halt budgets, stall capital projects, and leave residents without
      water or electricity while councillors trade positions.
    - _Bringing Secret Deals into the Sunlight: _
       Currently, coalition pacts are
      often treated as private party documents hidden from voters. Requiring every
      coalition agreement (and any amendment) to be published in the Provincial 
      Gazette allows ratepayers and civil society to hold coalition partners directly
      accountable for broken promises.
    - _Protecting Public Watchdogs (MPACs): _
       Governing coalitions frequently capture
      Municipal Public Accounts Committees to bury irregular expenditure. Mandating
      that the MPAC Chairperson come from an opposition party or non-coalition independent
      councillor—and protecting them from arbitrary firing—restores genuine financial
      oversight.
    - _Realistic Negotiation Timeframes: _
       Expanding the post-election window from
      14 days to 30 days stops rushed, panic-driven coalitions and gives parties
      time to negotiate coherent service delivery programmes rather than merely 
      dividing up mayoral committee seats.

[🔴 Arguments Against (What Opponents Say)](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/#1770892117205-3c7c32e1-ce3d5d6a-e1cd1d69-949086db-d4ddbdcb-dc45)

    - _Insulating Incompetence for a Full Year: _
       Civil society watchdogs (such
      as My Vote Counts) and governance analysts warn that stability is not an end
      in itself. Freezing motions of no confidence for 12 months—unless a leader
      commits a crime or violates the Constitution—means ratepayers are stuck with
      an ineffective or paralysed mayor for an entire budget cycle.
    - _Centralising Control in Pretoria: _
       Allowing the national Minister of COGTA
      to dictate the structure and dispute-resolution rules of local coalition agreements
      encroaches on the constitutional autonomy of local government (Section 151
      of the Constitution) and creates an opening for national political interference
      in local councils.
    - _Undermining Representative Accountability via Secret Ballots: _
       Voters elect
      councillors to take public stances on who governs their town. Permitting councils
      to vote by secret ballot on mayors and speakers removes transparency, making
      it impossible for citizens to know whether their ward councillor honoured 
      their mandate or sold their vote.
    - _Creating Unworkable Legal Deadlocks: _
       Making coalition agreements legally
      binding contracts enforceable through prescribed dispute mechanisms risks 
      turning routine political disagreements into protracted High Court battles
      that freeze municipal administration even further.
    - _Flawed Policy Foundation & Unfunded Mandates: _
       COGTA’s own Final SEIAS 
      Report (25 June 2026) budgets R0 (“None”) for councillor capacitation and 
      legal compliance, leaves the constitutional verification box blank, and improperly
      blames voters for “spreading votes amongst a magnitude of political parties”
      rather than addressing political party misconduct.

[ View more info](https://dearsouthafrica.co.za/coalitions-bill/summary)
